In Russia’s official foreign policy doctrine in 2000, there was no mention of oil and gas (Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2000); while the revision of the document in 2008 similarly makes no mention of oil or gas, it does contain the word ‘energy’ fourteen separate times in just twenty-one pages. In the eight-year period between the two documents, clearly, the importance of energy – primarily oil and gas - had come to the fore.
Russian Gas or European Entitlement?
At least part of the rise in the importance was economic. Consistent annual price rises meant that oil and gas both reached historical highs in the second half of the first decade of the 21st century. In turn, this allowed Russia to build considerable monetary reserves: these reached a peak of $598 billion in August 2008 (Pfeifer, 2015). Exactly ten years after it had defaulted on its debt, Russia was wealthier than it had ever been.
Wealth brought new-found confidence on the international stage. The fact that the EU slowly become dependent on Russian gas in the period leading up to 2008 can only have increased the feeling of confidence surrounding the country. In 1965, only 9% of European energy came from natural gas. By 2007, that total had increased to 35% (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009). This significance of this came under a stark spotlight in January 2006, in an incident between Russia and Ukraine.
A complex dispute in the year leading up to January 2006 was sparked by Turkmenistan raising the price of gas from $42/mcm to $60/mcm and Ukraine hoarding Gazprom gas inside its borders. The result of this dispute was Russia declaring that Ukraine would, from the beginning of 2006, have to pay “European prices” of $230/mcm. After various attempts at compromise, on January 1, 2006, Gazprom cut its gas supplies to Ukraine (Stark, 2006, p.7).
Europe receives most of its gas from Russia via pipelines Ukraine. When the gas taps were turned off in January 2006, there was an immediate impact in Europe – thought to have been caused by disruptions to the line as it passed under Ukraine. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe were affected most; Hungary lost around 40%, while others like Austria, Slovakia and Romania were down 33% and France by 25-30% (Stark, 2006, p. 7).
On January 4th, 2006, the dispute ended in the short-term and supplies returned to normal. However, the incident had drawn attention to how frail Europe’s energy situation was. A Financial Times article of the time said: The interruption of Ukraine’s shipments will damage Russia’s efforts to establish itself as a trustworthy energy supplier. It will also cast a shadow over President Vladimir Putin’s attempts to increase Russia’s global influence.” (The Financial Times, 2006).
The dispute between Russia and Ukraine was not an isolated case, either. In fact, it was repeated every year between 2006 and 2009, culminating in the winter of 2009 when, Ukraine thought “it had enough gas stocks to last until the spring, and it could confiscate Russian gas.” What ensued as a direct consequence of the dispute was termed: “the biggest energy emergency that the European Union has seen in years” (the Economist, 2009).
European Commission President spoke to leaders of both the Ukraine and Russia at the time. He “made it clear that it was unacceptable that the EU’s gas supply security was taken hostage to negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. He warned that their reputation was reliable partners [...] was at stake and insisted that Ukraine and Russia had to find a stable and long-term solution to guarantee reliable gas supplies to the EU” (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, 2006, p.46).
These incidents had already become so commonplace that the EU was putting steps in place to counter them. While the terms of the Energy Charter Treaty (Energy Community, 2016), in theory, should have guaranteed continuous gas supplies to Europe, they didn’t. The fact that it was nearly impossible for a to prove whether Russia wasn’t supplying gas to the Ukraine or Ukraine was stealing gas being supplied only compounded matters.
As the dispute subsided, the EC President outlined the role that the EC had played:
“I have spoken in considerable detail and with great regularity to [the Russian and Ukrainian presidents and prime ministers]. I have made it very clear throughout that we insisted on the immediate resumption of deliveries. […]We set up a monitoring team [...] which was vital for confidence building. But when it was clear that this was not enough, the Commission then sponsored the agreement on the Terms of Reference for the monitoring mission. [...] And finally when it was clear that agreement on the whole contract was going to be necessary in order for gas transit to be resumed, [Energy Commissioner Piebalgs] and I pushed hard for direct, substantial talks between the parties at a high political level. This has now led directly to settlement of the dispute” (Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, 2006, p. 48).Regardless of how the EC portrayed the incident – the latest of several at that time – the crisis once again showed the vulnerability of the EU’s energy security. At the time of the 2009 dispute, 42% of the EU’s gas came from Russia (European Commission, 2008) and this share was slowly rising as internal EU supplies of gas were dwindling. Without effective measures being put in place, the EU would continue to be as vulnerable, and indeed, more vulnerable, into the future.
In May 2014, at least in part as a response to these concerns, the European Commission released its Energy Security Strategy (EC, 2014). As part of the strategy, all EU members and several European members of the ECT, carried out energy security stress tests. These involved carrying out two energy supply disruption scenarios for specified periods. Notably, both scenarios involved Russian gas imports: one scenario involving a disruption of Russian gas imports and the other, a complete halt.
Perhaps predictably, the stress tests showed that in either scenario, the effect on the EU would be severe. Nevertheless, it also showed that if all EU members shared energy resources, a crisis could be offset for half a year. Despite the adoption of energy security preparedness plans by EU members in 2015, the situation as of winter 2016 remains broadly as it was in December 2009: Russian gas imports continue to pose both a solution and a problem to the EU’s long-term energy requirements.
State of Current Research
There is a rich academic literature surrounding Europe’s energy security issues with regards to Russian. This literature goes back at least as far as Jaffe (2001). However, the output of research on the topic does appear to have picked up considerable pace since Russia’s stand-off with Ukraine in the winter of 2005 and 2006. Incidentally, this has also coincided with a spate of EU-authored documents, leaving the suspicion that the publishing of one may lead to the publishing of another.
There are some excellent works of research to be recommended in the literature, among them Belyi (2009), Boussena and Locatelli (2011), and Kuzemko (2014). These papers not only outline how the current situation has evolved, but also provide insightful interpretation, which appears to be fully objective. There is little disparity in the arguments or the narrative between Russian authors and Western authors, which can be a positive and a negative point.
There is a thorough coverage of the recent history and the current outlook for EU energy security. There is also plenty of references made to economics, geopolitics and even advances in other energy sources like those new fields located in South East Europe and LNG finds in the USA. However, there are some shortcomings which can be identified in much of the current research, some of which have been outlined in the sections below.
i) An Historical Perspective
Much of the literature leaves the impression that Europe’s history of dealing with Russia goes back as far as 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even if the EU as an official bloc is a much newer entity than Europe the continent, many of its members have been dealing with Russia for centuries. This makes the relationship far more nuanced than many of the papers allow for. As a result, Russian leaders may not see the EU as the great political project that several EU leaders might.
Current Russian President Vladimir Putin sometimes refers to Russia saving Europe from “fascists” in World War II (Traynor, 2014). While most people appear to want to move on from the regrettable events of World War II for the sake of progress (and not repeating them), Putin grew up in a country which commemorates wars regularly and at no little expense. This surely colours the Russian perspective but it is not mentioned in the literature.
ii) A Tendency to View Energy Security as a Product of Two or Three Separate Factors
Stern (2006) and Pirani, Stern and Yafimava (2009) provide excellent background information to the Russia-Ukraine gas crises of 2006 and 2009 respectively. They manage to illustrate very well how events such as Turkmenistan raising its gas prices can trigger energy crises as far away as Hungary within just a few days. These papers provide a step-by-step walk-through of each crisis, ultimately outlining how difficult they were to prevent.
Much of the rest of the literature lacks this in-depth analysis, even taking into account the lack of detail surrounding high-level meetings between the EC and the Russian and Ukraine Governments around that time. Many works of research are focused on headline issues such as energy prices, supply and demand and a more confident Russia and issues surrounding prospective pipelines in Europe.
iii) The Lack of Recognition for Russian Presence Inside Europe
Linked to issue (i) above, is the lack of recognition of a Russian presence inside Europe. Several hundred thousand Russian citizens were left in Eastern European countries – particularly Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia – after the collapse of the Soviet Union. While many of these countries were separated from Russia less than thirty years ago, they are now members of NATO whose historical role has anecdotally been to ‘keep Russia out.’
Although this isn’t likely to have any direct consequences on the relationship between Europe and Russia in terms of energy, it does provide context to how Russian government members may feel “squeezed in” or threatened, as previous members of their own community turn arms against them. This is a nuance that is missed in the literature when discussing Russian objectives in each country – which the literature primarily puts down to economics and Putin belligerence.
iv) The Caricaturization of Russia and Vladimir Putin
One of the most common failings of the literature is falling into the trap of caricaturing Russia and Vladimir Putin as abrasive, difficult and sometimes even overtly aggressive. There is no question that the literature misquotes Mr. Putin and to this end, the quotes are justified. The feeling remains, however, that there is an overuse of bombastic language where Putin and Russia are concerned. For example: "Russia’s energy resources play the same role for Russia today that nuclear weapons played for the Soviet Union” (Bouzarovski and Bassin, 2011).
No such provocative language can be found in the literature about Europe, which creates the impression of a situation which is good versus evil. Averre (2009) addresses this shortcoming, knowingly or not, when saying: “it is too simplistic to talk of a benign normative power in Europe in relentless competition with a malign Russian ‘sphere of influence’”. In this same vein, very little mention is given to Gerhard Schroeder, former chancellor of Germany, becoming Chairman of Gazprom after leaving the government in what could be construed at best as a conflict of interest, and at worst, as malign and self-serving.
v) A Lack of Transparency on the EU side
The EU is generally a transparent organization where reliable data is easily retrievable. However, because Gazprom has been negotiating gas provision contracts with individual companies and countries inside the EU, rather than the bloc as a whole, the economic side of the energy security of Europe is difficult to present. In addition, who are the players negotiating these contracts with Russia and what are their incentives for doing so?
These are questions which are difficult, if not impossible, to answer for the majority of academic researchers and they will likely remain a limitation of the current study. However, they are one aspect which is lacking in the current body of literature, and could make an interesting addition in the future were increased transparency on the EU side to arise.
Literature Review and Theory
Conceptualizing Energy Security
The global energy crisis of the 1970s was a landmark, which brought the issue of energy security to the forefront of people’s minds. It led to the establishment of the International Energy Agency in November 1974. An autonomous agency, its primary mandate was to promote energy security amongst its member nations and provide authoritative analysis on ways to ensure reliable, affordable and clean energy (Jewell, 2011).
The recognition of energy security as a pressing global issue then demanded that it was conceptualized or defined; if a country has no energy resources to begin with, is that more of an energy crisis than a country whose energy resources fall by a percentage in a short period of time? And what percentage fall constitutes a crisis? Issues like these would need to be addressed for the sake of defining energy security.
Several authors in the literature have sought to conceptualize the issue and effectively answer these questions (Kruyt et al, 2009; Winzer, 2011). At the outset of their paper, Kruyt et al note: “the concept of energy security is widely used, yet there is no consensus on its precise interpretation.” They begin to attempt to conceptualize the issue by dividing energy security into four separate issues: availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability.
The authors admit that they are unable to make firm, unambiguous statements. As a result, their findings features statements like “focusing on different aspects of energy security yields different outlooks.” However, despite this, they suggest that conventional oil resources could be depleted by 2035 meaning that other sources of energy will need to take its place (and presumably become more expensive in the process).
Elsewhere, Winzer (2011) notes that is a multitude of definitions for energy security, which can be characterized according to the sources of risk, the scope of the impacts, and the severity filters in the form of the speed, size, sustention, spread, singularity and sureness of impacts (where impacts are monetary changes measured in currency). The author provides several definitions for each of these categories from other papers in the field of energy security.
He concludes with a definition of energy security as “the continuity of energy supplies relative to demand,” which seems like an impartial and rational definition for how we think about the issue of energy security. He expands on the definition by noting: “If energy security is defined from the perspective of private utilities, end consumers or public servants, the concept could further be reduced to the continuity of specific commodity or service supplies or the impact of supply discontinuities o the continuity of the economy.”
Badea (2010) provides us with a range of indicators, ranging from the simplistic to the complex, which allows us to measure the energy security of one country versus another. Simple examples are provided by ratios calculating energy dependency for different energy sources, reserves-to-production ratios to diversification indicators like the Shannon-Wiener Index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
Finally, Belyi (2003) notes that ‘security’ in ‘energy security’ is sometimes confused with a threat, when, instead, it should be thought of as the result of a process of ‘securitization,’ where the energy is secured by the country in the sense of being guaranteed. The author also correctly notes that as Europe expands, with new members and new legislation, the concept of ‘securitization’ needs to be fluid to adapt to the new situation.
Russia, Energy and the West
Academic interest in Russia has expanded at a seemingly ever-increasing pace in the last 20 years, primarily in the fields of geopolitics and economics. Energy has also come to the fore in this literature in the past 15 years as energy prices have risen to historically high levels. Although Europe had negotiated energy deals with Russia which brought stability in the 1970s and 1980s (Boussena and Locatelli, 2011), they receive very little attention in the academic literature. Instability, in fact, seems to be of far more interest to researchers.
Authors like Belyi (2003) and Jaffe and Manning (2001) provide ample background context for the Russian-Europe relationship. The latter strike a positive note, they say: “It (energy) can be a source of conflict, but also offers much scope for cooperative activity before Russia and the West – before saying that energy can have an integrative effect on their relationship, rather than a divisive one. The authors are one of the few to explicitly state that energy is a key part of Russia’s international diplomacy strategy.
Echoing a point which was made in the State of Research section, the authors reference Russia’s situation in the 21st century vis-à-vis its situation for most of the 20th century. They note that where nearly all of Russia’s export routes once passed through Soviet or territories covered by the Warsaw Pact, the majority of their exports now cross NATO or potential NATO countries. And Black Sea oil, which must clear the narrow Bosporus Strait, which is ultimately policed by NATO member and long-time US ally, Turkey.
Meanwhile, Belyi (2003) says that Russia’s place in the EU’s calculations can be observed from three separate dimensions of the energy security policy, each with its own specific logic: i) a political dimension related to the reduction of energy import dependency, ii) an economic dimension or the creation of a competitive market and the encouraging of energy price volatility and, iii) a normative dimension through the promotion of international institutions, acting as an additional systemic factor for an energy policy.
Reciprocity
The issue of reciprocity is one that arises again and again in the literature; the first time it receives a mention at the EU-level was in 2006, when according to McGowan (2008), a joint document prepared by the European Council and Commission in June of that year stated: “the EU should advocate reciprocity in market opening and respect for market rules: non-discrimination, competition, transparency and enforcement.”
The so-called ‘Gazprom clause,’ was introduced by EU in September 2008 in the Energy Liberalization Plan as a measure to protect EU interests within the common market is mentioned in the literature by Dimitrova and Dragneva (2009). In the plan it was referred to as a ‘reciprocity clause’ but onlookers could read between the lines and interpret that its inclusion was intended for reciprocity with Gazprom only – hence the name, ‘Gazprom clause.’
The introduction of the clause means that companies would be unable to buy European energy network assets (in production or distribution) without an agreement between the government of that country and the EU. Until its introduction, Gazprom had been signing deals around Europe to partially own gas pipelines and storage hubs. The Gazprom deal meant that Russia had to speak to Europe one on one, rather than playing ‘divide and conquer’ with a series of smaller nations.
Interestingly, Dimitrova and Dragneva (2009) interpret the Gazprom clause as being more aimed ‘at inducing third countries to play by the EU’s rules. However, they do note: “These developments support our view that interdependence and consequent openings for Russia to exercise its power are the causal factors that may lead to the institutionalization of energy policy in the EU. Existing institutional arrangements cannot provide for a successful projection of EU policies.
Belyi (2009) makes a further outstanding contribution to the literature, with a paper that addresses the issues of reciprocity between Russia and Europe on the issue of gas supplies. He introduces the concept of the acquis commauntaires by countries which are not EU members, with the notion being that Russia has not signed up for the acquis, implying it needs to be treated differently to other countries as a result.
Being a Russian, we can assume that Belyi has a more sympathetic view towards the Russian point of view than many authors, but also a more insightful one an objectivity viewpoint. It states that reciprocity is often spoken of as a positive-sum game, when in fact, it should be looked at as a zero-sum game: Russia does not see itself as being responsible for EU energy security, and the EU does not see itself as being responsible for guaranteeing demand for Russian output.
The author also introduces an idea from the Copenhagen School which is that for reciprocity to work, the scale of the security issue needs to be realistic; there has been a tendency to exaggerate energy security requirements, destroying any potential for reciprocity in the process. The example of the United States after the incidents of September 11, 2001, are used to show how securitization can be used to politicize a threat out of proportion.
McGowan (2008) notes some progress in the area of reciprocity, saying that the European Commission, in particular, has pushed a policy of ‘reciprocity’ in the treatment of market access and investment in the gas distribution an production sectors. But even at European level, where self-interests are common, there can be significant opposition to changes in this area.
Belyi (2009) introduces the idea that the EU should not attempt to engage Russia in a ‘one-sided courtship’ where the emphasis is placed on Western efforts but ‘not on Russia engaging the West’. He stresses that while energy can be used to bring Russia further into a pluralist, market-based economy, this process must be one of mutual accommodation.
Finally, Cameron (2009) suggests that although reciprocity is a noble goal, it has not worked well to date in dealings between the EU and Russia. He states that while Russia wants access to European markets for its own energy firms, it is “not prepared to allow reciprocal arrangements for EU companies,” although this viewpoint does seem to be guilty of the Russophobe attitudes discussed in the current state of the literature section.
The EU and Russia: Perspectives in conflict and Asymmetric Interdependence
What emerges very clearly from the existing academic literature is that energy security is far more than a market issue between the EU and Russia – much as EU-authored white papers would suggest that. market factors are what drive the relationship. Several papers (Bouzarovski and Bassin, 2011; De Haas, 2010; Umbach, 2010; and others) touch on the issue of Russia’s perceive soft powers increasing with energy prices over the course of his Presidency and that of Medvedev.
De Haas (2010) pays particular attention to this phenomenon. He notes marked changes in Putin’s attitude towards the West during his second term (2004-2008), which he attributes to a significant rise in energy prices over the same period. He states: “In Putin’s second term, due to the high prices for oil and gas, the revenues of energy resources had strengthened Russia’s economy to such an extent that Moscow could advance in an international security policy further away and less dependent on its (economic) ties with the West.”
In a section entitled, “Energy as an essential instrument of power,” (p. 160), the author notes that as Putin gradually began to realize the importance of energy (both from an economic and strategic standpoint), he began to use it as an “economic, political and military tool of leverage.” This is somewhat tautological and perhaps even unfair on Russia – what are the assets of a country for if not to use as leverage of some form or another?
De Haas elaborates: “In order to exploit this instrument, he took economic, human resources, military, policy-thinking and policy-execution measures…By 2007, the Kremlin-controlled some 30% of oil and 87% of the nation’s natural gas production. Putin also demanded to have personal control over the energy sector by appointing state officials in key positions of vital enterprises.”
What is particularly interesting as De Haas notes, is how for the first time in Russia’s modern history, “energy (resources and security) became part of security documents, i.e. in the Overview of Foreign Policy (2007) and the Strategy 2020 (2008).” Furthermore, the 2009 NSS (National Security Strategy) openly declared that Moscow considered energy resources as a tool of leverage to use on other states, which it did with Ukraine (2005/06 and 2008/09), Georgia (2006), Estonia (2007) and the Czech Republic (2008).
Umbach (2010) follows a similar theme, noting how Putin’s energy policies are used “as a political instrument to enforce its economic and geopolitical interests” and believes that this “will be proved as self-defeating in Russia’s long-term strategic interests. It will reduce Gazprom’s gas exports to a much smaller EU gas market than originally forecasted as the result of a deliberate EU policy of decreasing its overall gas demand and by diversifying its gas imports.”
Umbach also notes how Russia planted a Russian flag at the bottom of the Arctic ocean on August 2, 2007, which highlighted a new form of resource nationalism in Russia and “its political ambitions to adopt unilateral strategies and power politics rather than following approaches of international law
and multilateral political cooperation over an area that might be at the forefront of future international crisis over exploration rights linked with unsolved territorial claims.”
From the EU perspective (bearing in mind that the EU perspective is a conglomeration of different viewpoints and that former Warsaw Pact countries tend to have vastly different viewpoints on Russia than those countries further west), the issue of energy security is framed much more as a market issue than a geopolitical one. There is reasonable from the outside looking in, given that EU members have to pay what Russia terms “European prices.”
Metais (2014) states that European gas production peaked in 2006 and that output continues to decline year-on-year, while consumption has been growing ever since; in this context, it’s not difficult to see why the EU would espouse the benefits of an open market – because there are no other options open to them, aside from developing alternatives to natural gas, which isn’t an easy option in the short- to mid-term.
Dreyer and Stang (2014) note that EU-led actions in the market for energy are driven by the motive to reduce its members' strategic dependence on external suppliers (read: Russia) and to “ensure that the energy markets are liquid, open and functioning according to stable market rules rather than power logic.” They comment how many countries, presumably including Russia, “prefer to secure energy supplies via a state-led mechanism, relying less on markets than do Western importers.”
Metais (2014) believes that the EU finds itself somewhere between a market approach and a geopolitical approach (which may be the reality for most countries who are net energy importers). He notes: “Since then [the 1980s], internal energy market liberalization has continuously been presented by EU officials as the main tool to address European energy security concerns, including the security of supply.” However, the reciprocity clause, mentioned in the previous pages, seems to contradict the spirit of this market liberalization.
He notes a further flaw in the EU objective to liberalize gas markets in that “perfect liberalization of energy markets in an economic sense cannot be achieved, due to the particularities of fossil energy sources,” continuing: “Particularly on the gas market, prices may not convey the correct signals to govern change in production patterns as the resource is non-renewable.” Gas markets are also characterized by long time-lags between investments and payoffs, which becomes more of a difficulty as the EU has committed to the UN’s 2020 goals.
Kuzemko (2014) acknowledges that a large part of the existing literature puts an onerous blame at Russia’s doorstep for the deterioration in EU-Russia energy relations. Interestingly, he notes that as part of the new Russia, “natural resources are interpreted not as replaceable commodities (as they would be in a liberal market economy) but as national, strategic assets, they are understood, if managed correctly, as capable of playing a central role in Russia’s economic and political recovery.”
Perceptions of Russia and its Energy Strategy
Although none of the papers in this review are ostensibly about Western perceptions about Russia, many betray either the opinion of the author, Western leaders and even Russians themselves, about Russia’s role as an anti-capitalist geopolitical bully in the context of the EU’s energy security question. While much of this material comes in the form of direct quotes, nothing of a similar vein was found on EU leaders, who are shown to be market-oriented and forward-looking.
Leonard and Popescu (2007) note that Russia’s “sticks are sharper than the EU’s: It can impose full-scale blockades, sudden increases in gas prices and infrastructure takeovers; it can also offer support for separatist entities, and even exert military pressures on states that refuse to yield to Russian demands.” When looked at from this perspective, it can be difficult to tell with Russia whether its gas trade with the EU is a stick or a carrot.
Examples of this use of language abound. Metais (2014) notes how the Nordstream gas pipeline project has been characterized in the past by former Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Radoslaw Sikorski, as a “new Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.” Such language is provocative at best and anti-Russian/German at worst. However, it is the kind of language which runs throughout the discourse on energy security in the EU and shows how much foreign relations overlap with energy security concerns.
Russia’s energy supplies are often referred to as a ‘weapon’ or an ‘arsenal’ (Umbach, 2010; Baran, 2007; Bouzarovski and Bassin, 2011; De Haas, 2010; Spanjer, 2007), while in the EU context, it is only ever referred to as an asset or in other market-centric terms. In addition, the term ‘sphere of influence’ is used in several papers with regards to Russia’s geopolitical aims (Dimitrova and Dragneva, 2009; Averre, 2009 and others).
The idea that Russia is employing a ‘divide and conquer’ or ‘divide and rule’ strategy in Europe is also a common one that can be found in several parts of the literature (Baran, 2007; Jaffe and Manning, 2001, De Haas, 2010). Metais (2013) mentions Russia’s “attempts to divide the Europeans.” Also, Dreyer and Stang (2014) comment that, until recently, energy interests were divided among a ‘west versus the rest’ approach (where Russia constitutes the latter group).
Even as the European Energy Charter is shown to be ineffective in resolving the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in January 2009, Stern (2009) says that Putin’s response, where he says that the Energy Charter “has failed to become a working instrument to regulate emerging problems,” is “predictably harsh.” Predictable or not, it is difficult to see what another conclusion can be drawn from the Charter’s role (or lack of one) in the outcome of the 2008/2009 gas dispute.
Hashimoto (2011) agrees with Putin’s summation: “The Energy Charter Treaty proved to be ineffective in regulating the energy trade between Russia and the European Union because it was imposing the norms and values beneficial for the energy security of the European Union.”
Perceptions of Europe and its Energy Strategy
If the perception of Russia in the literature is one of a verbally aggressive former superpower, the impression is given of the EU (and by extension, the EC) is one of a fumbling bureaucracy.
Stern (2009) notes in impressions from the 2008-2009 energy dispute between Ukraine and Russia: “the overall impression from the crisis was that, in the situation, the Commission: i) had little technical capability and needs to rely on the industry for monitoring capability; ii) had little political credibility or political leverage with either Ukraine or Russia; iii) was unable or unwilling to provide the financial resources to resolve the crisis.”
Cohen (2007) noted that the EU’s chances of ever gaining energy security are shrinking as Gazprom acquires more and more assets inside the EU-27. De Haas (2010) compounds this by saying: “Considering that seven out of 27 EU member states are involved in constructing new Russian pipeline networks, there is still a lot of work to be done to reach a united EU stance on energy policy against Russia’s policy of ‘divide and rule’ and using energy (security) as a power tool.”
Dimitrova and Dragneva (2009) note that “the EU’s external governance, especially when it involves institutionalized frameworks for political dialogue, networks or non-state actors, contrasts to Russia’s traditional politics of power.” They suggest that the EU lacks the capability to enforces its “neighborhood policies” with any nations other than those that wish to join the EU (i.e. Russia) and that its internal policies (e.g. energy market liberalization) may even be difficult to enact.
Hashimoto (2011) despite acknowledging the EU as an influential force on the world stage, says that it is “weak in terms of hard power.” Hashimoto also notes that “The fact that the EU has no integrated policy on energy yet puts a break on its management of the issue at the multilateral level, as opposed to bilateral relations of Member States with Moscow.” The idea that the EU has been weak in building a coherent strategy is a common theme running through the literature.
Baran (2007), taking account of the EU’s inability to work in cohesion states: “Every member pursuing its own energy policy only decreases overall EU security – although specific supplier choices can be made at the state level, these decisions must complement the broader strategic goals set by the EU.” Kuzemoko (2014) echoes these sentiments, by stating: “internal ideological differences challenge the dominance and credibility of market liberal ideas and policies, the EU’s ability to speak with one voice in energy and attest to an increasingly complex and contradictory EU energy policy.”
The theme also runs through the research of Leonard and Popescu (2007) who state that despite the EU’s advantage over Russia in almost every economic indicator – with European GDP dwarfing that of Russia despite its resources – “Europeans are squandering their most useful source of leverage: their unity.” It is this thinking, presumably, which led the EU to develop its Energy Strategy of 2014, which calls for a united front in energy security.
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