Russia’s relationship
with the international community is not only topical given Russia’s recent
military involvement in the Ukraine, but it is also one which students of
international relations continuously find difficult to pin down. Winston
Churchill once famously said of Russia: “I cannot forecast to you the action of
Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma,” (Lo, 2002) reflecting
its often difficult relationship with the outside world. In the period since
Churchill’s quote, it could be said that Russia’s international relations are
no easier to define.
Russia’s relations can
be testy with the outside world at the best of times. When the Obama
administration came to power in 2009, the administration sought to have a “reset”
of the relationship between the two nations. This coincided with several
PR-stunts involving leaders from both sides with the media in tow. It didn’t
last long, however, and as of 2014, it seems that Russian-American relations
are as low as they have been in several years. Since Russia’s intervention in
the Ukraine, relations seem to have deteriorated further still. A number of
sanctions have been put in place by the Obama administration against Russia
(Feaver and Lorber, 2014). However, the relationships between Russia and United
States, and that between Russia and Europe are clearly different. It seems clear
that something more than mere geography or history might be the reason for
this.
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| The notorious reset button, now available on Ebay.com |
Perhaps we can read
something into Russia’s relationships with the outside world by looking at
economics in particular. Given the interconnectedness of the world economy now
and the importance that trade plays in the welfare of many states, it seems a
fair assumption to make that international relations might be shaped by
economics. Russia would not be alone in using economics as a tool to shape its
international relations. The United States, the world’s largest economy, seems
to turn to economics on an increasing basis as either an incentive or a
sanction to shape its own relationship with other countries. For example, in
the past five years alone, it has issued sanctions against Libya, Sudan, Syria,
Myanmar, North Korea and indeed, Russia.
Therefore, there would
seem to be precedence for suggesting that economics tell us a lot about
international relations and Russia is no different. We can probably tell more
now than at any other stage before in history. As communism fell and the doors
to trade opened, there is more transparency into where Russia’s capital flows
to. What might these capital flows tell us something about its relationship
with various players in the international community? Given the broad scope of
what constitutes the international community, I would like to particularly
focus on the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union. I
believe the economic ties of all three parties with Russia can tell us
something about the increasingly important role that economics play in
international relations.
What
does the reaction of the international community to Russia tell us about the
role of economics in international relations?
Before this, it had been a centrally-planned
socialist economy, more or less excluded from trade with economic actors in the
world. Naturally, this economic exclusion tied in with a political exclusion.
In 1992, when Russia made the change to a market economy, the language used in
the west often reflected the fact that the Russians were looked down upon.
Examples of titles in the academic literature include, “Coming of Age in
Post-Soviet Russia” (Markowitz, 2000), “Without a Map: Political Tactics and
Economic Reform in Russia,” (Schliefer and Treisman, 2000) and “The
Piratization of Russia: Reform goes Awry.” (Goldman, 2003).
A lot of the negativity
in the academic literature refers to the period after it entered the world
economy and underwent privatization. In fact, it is difficult – if not
impossible – to find any examples in the literature about this period which
portrays Russia in a positive light. A cursory Google search of “Boris Yeltsin”
alone yields a series of results which can only be described as mocking. On the
first page of results alone, these include “4 international incidents caused by
drunk (sic) Boris Yeltsin,” “Highlights of Boris Yeltsin (funny moments)” and
“1994: Sleepy Boris Yeltsin snubs Irish leader.” It isn’t hard to imagine given
this seemingly sneering attitude in the west towards Russia that Russians
themselves might want to re-assert themselves.
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| Yeltsin was commonly derided but he faced an uphill task with Russia in the early 1990s. |
There are several ways
in which nations assert themselves in the world. Prime among these is through
economics. The World Trade Organization (henceforth, “WTO”) is a group of nations,
which might well be called “the international economic community.” Gaining
access to this group is a way for a developing economy to show progress on more
than just an economic level – it’s a signalling mechanism for the country,
almost part of a large rebranding. When it became a market economy again in
1992, one of the state goals of Russia was to enter the WTO (Chowdhury, 2003).
The entry process to the
WTO tells us a lot about economics and international relations in general. Prospective
members of the WTO must first apply to the WTO secretariat, which organizes a
working party composed of all states with “an interest” in the accession
(political, economic or otherwise) (Fean, 2012). This took a longer amount of
time than usual with Russia given its complicated international relations with
several of the parties that composed its working party. Fean (2012) notes, “the
length of time this took was a source of immense irritation to Moscow.
Frustration is not unusual in accession processes, the onus being on the
candidate to reply to member state concerns. In Russia’s case, the working
party comprised over fifty interested states, including some with whom Russia
has difficult relations, Georgia foremost among these.” On the other side, the
biggest support that Russia had in favour of this came from the EU bloc, where
most of Russia’s imports and exports are concentrated (Chowdhury, 2003).
Kuchins and Zevelev
(2012) provide analysis of Russia’s relations with the outside world in a
paper, which makes an interesting comparison between Chinese foreign policy and
Russian foreign policy: “unlike current Chinese policy, Russian policy based
primarily on great power balancers´[1]
views seems to approach the global economy with its guard up.” (p. 150). Later
in the paper, the authors suggest, “the defeat of the liberal reformers, caused
principally by the economic crisis in the early 1990s, shifted Russian foreign
policy to more traditionalist realist concepts asserting national interests and
expanding power and influence.” (p. 153).
Seeming to confirm
these conclusions, Russia introduced a policy paper for foreign affairs in
early 2013 (Monaghan, 2013), which effectively laid out Russia’s future
strategy with regard to foreign policy. According to Monaghan (2013, p. 3),
“the concept is a natural update of Russia’s views given domestic and
international developments since 2008, and it fits into strategic planning
guidelines that envisage medium-term updates approximately every five years.”
What changed in 2008? The world economy changed quite considerably around that
time, at least from a western perspective.
Another example of this
is the G8 group of nations (the largest 8 economies in the world), which meet
for a summit each year to discuss matters of broad international interest. In
the early part of this year, for example, Russia was excluded from this group
by the other members because of its incursion into the Ukraine (Borger, 2014).
This exclusion from the group in the short term was less of a sanction against
Russia (the G8 hasn’t got the capacity to sanction Russia, despite its supposed
power), and more of a slap on the wrist.
Energy – itself
comprising the vast majority of Russia’s economy – shows how economic matters
dictate Russia’s relationships with other nations. In the past 10 years, it has
used its control of vast energy resources as a tool in disputes against
Belarus, the Baltic States, the European Union, Georgia and the Ukraine
(Walker, 2007). There may also be others. What seems to be clear from Russia’s
dealings with these nations is that there is a symbiotic relationship that
exists between them and Russia: they benefit from it, as does Russia. The same
could be said of all trade relations but it is particularly true of Russia’s
international relations given that the economic ties are mainly based on energy
contracts.
The year 2014 has
provided some good insight into the international relations of Russia and how
they might be based more on economic ties than is typically true of relations
between nations. Russia invaded the Ukraine in February of 2014 and attracted
widespread criticism from the international community in doing so. However, the
reaction of various countries to Russia’s invasion was quite telling. The
United States immediately began issuing sanctions against several highly-placed
ministers and economic agents in Russia. The EU, on the other hand, demanded
that Russia enter dialogue with the Ukraine. The UK did similarly. Notably,
neither the EU nor the UK issued any sanctions against Russia during this time.
Clearly, the what differentiates the relationship between Russia and the United
States to that of the EU and the UK is economics.
I would assert that
there are cooler relations between the United States and Russia not because of
military actions – as is often stated – but rather because of economics. That
is, the economics between the two nations are largely irrelevant, so each
treats the other in a denigrating fashion. Wingfield (2012) notes that in 2011,
just 0.6% of all US Exports by value went to Russia. Similarly, Russia doesn’t
energy to the United States, so quite the opposite of being a symbiotic
relationship, theirs is a relationship of irrelevance to Russia.
Russia’s relationship
with the EU and the UK, however, is markedly different. At the same time that
large EU nations such as the UK and France spoke tough against Russia’s actions
in the Ukraine, both were exporting arms and helicopters to Russia. The UK has
granted over 400 visas to Russians in the past 10 years, each costing visa
costing in the region of £10 million each. The arms licenses between the UK and
Russia which existed even after Russia invaded the Ukraine were thought to be
worth around £132 million. Given these figures, it’s not difficult to see how
Russia can have differing relations with various countries in the international
community.
Russia has acknowledged
that the European Union has a dependence on its energy resources. Given that it
is aware of the dependence, it no doubt casts its net accordingly and weaves
its international relationships quite closely to the economics of the given
situation. It may even be that Russia sees economics as the best way of
maximizing its relationship with everyone as opposed to what seems to be the
case with most other countries: that they use close diplomatic ties to maximize
economics. Quotes from the beginning of 2014 would seem to back this theory up.
Romero (2014) quotes Putin as saying, “Can Europe stop buying Russian gas? I think
it’s impossible. Will they make themselves bleed? That’s hard to imagine.” With
regard to the United States, Putin said, “If prices decrease in the global
market, the emerging shale industry will die.”
Russia’s international
relations are so attached to economics because, conversely, Russia itself is
not part of any trading bloc. In a sense, this means that Russia is more
defined than most by its economic ties. As Emerson (2014) notes: “Russia is the
only major economy in the world that has no preferential agreements with the EU
(either already or in the course of negotiation) or in fact with any other
major trading bloc.” In this regard, Russia could be seen to be less of a
player trading in a community and more of an independent entity whose
relationships are based on transactions when and where these transactions need
to be made. Whether or not it loses out because of this antagonistic approach
is difficult to say; the nature of trading blocs is that goods become cheaper
(providing less to the seller and a benefit to the buyer) but Russia’s monopoly
on energy to Europe and its play-hard stance means that it can push up prices
more or less as it suits. My contention is that the relationship between Russia
and all other nations will change as economics dictates. We can tell a lot
about Russia and its international relations from its economic ties.
Bibliography
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2014). “G7 countries snub Putin and refuse to attend planned G8 summit in
Russia.” The Guardian. Available online at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/24/g7-countries-snub-putin-refuse-attend-g8-summit-russia
(retrieved 25/07/14)
Chowdhury, A. (2003).
“WTO Accession: What’s in it for Russia?” William Davidson Institute Working
Paper 595.
Emerson, M. (2014).
“Trade policy issues in the wider Europe – that led to war and not yet to
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Policy Studies.
Fean, D. (2012).
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Feaver, P., Lorber, E.,
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Romero, H. (April 17,
2014). “Putin says oil wars with Russia will make west bleed.” RT.com.
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