Media Reaction to Another Round of Peace Negotiations in Israel and Palestine

It could be easy to take a generalist approach when looking at the Israeli media. However, we can nonetheless advance some theories about the reaction of the media should Israel and the Palestinians begin another round of negotiations towards signing a peace agreement. Although a peace settlement of one form or another is arguably in everybody’s long term interests, the media is likely to exaggerate the content of peace talks in one form or another.

Context is everything. Media outlets, traditional and otherwise, are wrestling among each other for decreasing revenues. In such a climate, sensationalist pieces make better cover – and generate more revenues (or at least, that’s how much of the prevailing thinking goes). In peace negotiations, the process often moves at a snail’s pace. Another round of negotiations towards peace (“here we go again”) is likely to stimulate some nationalist comment in the newspapers and elsewhere.

The peace negotiations are sure to stir up the “rally around the flag” rhetoric that becomes commonplace in media outlets during wartime. It’s not difficult to envisage a situation whereby Israeli negotiators are seen to give some concessions to the Palestinian side. It’s unlikely the concessions would be too significant in their impact but the Israeli media response is likely to converge around how Israel is, “giving in to terrorists” or “bowing to international pressure.”

In fact, an international element (America, Europe, the G8, etc.) will likely play some role, active or passive, in future peace negotiations. This could create a voice within the Israeli media, which questions the need for any outside participation at all. As much as every country and economic bloc has its own issues to contend with, the media is likely to draw comparisons between the UK and Northern Ireland. So, for example, “Northern Ireland has more so-called peace walls now than it did before the Good Friday Agreement and the UK wants to lecture us on how to achieve peace?”

Narrative-building like this is common in media, not just in Israel. In times when there is less headline-creating news, features – and political features – become more common. Features are open to being driven by narratives rather than what is happening. So, whereas the news would report about representatives from both sides entering a room, a lot of back and forth, and little outcome to report, a feature might present a narrative about these negotiations being part of a bigger Middle Eastern plot to oust the Israeli government.

Furthermore, when conflicts are polarized, as is the case in Israel, there is a tendency for people to view politicians from the other side as not only representatives of the people but almost representations of their people. So, when Israeli media outlets, rightly or wrongly, portray leaders of Hamas as anti-Semitic fundamentalists, there is a natural tendency (not just in Israel) for people to view all supporters of Hamas in the same light. Polarized views become the norm, whereas in reality, populations are like everything else – there is a normal curve representing all views across the political spectrum.

Once peace negotiations have been concluded – with a resolution or without - how the media presents what occurred within the negotiations is likely to impact on future efforts for peace (be they negotiations, efforts on the ground, etc.). Although war makes better print coverage than peace; the examples of Lord Kitchener’s “Britain Needs You” poster from 1914, or its American equivalent featuring Uncle Sam from 1917 or even Russian wartime propaganda posters  («Не болтай!» meaning “Don’t talk!” being the most famous). Somewhat regrettably, it is difficult to recall any peacetime slogans, imagery or print from these countries.

However, one piece of research in particular, on the role of media in (relative) peacetime in Israel (Wolfsfeld and Alimi, 2008) makes an outstanding contribution to the existing literature. The authors note that that is an “inherent contradiction between news and peace,” but note that leaders on either side of a conflict have the ability to initiate stories that provide hope to their people. Likewise, some form of peace can create novel news structures about “the other side.” They comment, “even negative stories about diplomatic and economic relations between the countries remind people that something fundamentally has changed and that normalization is possible.”

Bibliography

Wolfsfeld, G.,  Alimi, E.Y., Wasfi, K. (2008). News Media and Peace Building in Asymmetrical Conflicts: The Flow of News between Jordan and Israel. Political Studies: 2008 Vol. 56, pp. 374–398

Foreign Policy Impasses: Notes from Northern Ireland

Be a student of history, not its prisoner. That is the major lesson to be taken away from Northern Ireland’s peace process. Its history is littered with sectarianism, human rights abuses and terrorist atrocities. And yet, in 1998, the two sides of its bloody conflict signed an agreement (the “Good Friday Agreement”) which has led to decommissioning of terrorist weapons, a swathe of reformed institutions and most importantly, a shared democracy.[i]

The conflict which dogged Northern Ireland for over 30 years illustrates how even the most entrenched foreign policy impasses can be overcome if the desire for some form of resolution is present. To understand the extent to which the positions were entrenched in Northern Ireland, one has to look at its history and gain an overview of the opposing cultural and political standpoints that have existed there, side by side, for centuries.

Northern Ireland

A Brief History of Northern Ireland

In the 1600s, the island of Ireland was a troublesome colony of the British Empire. Rebellions among the Irish against British rule were commonplace and a constant drain on Britain’s resources. Ireland’s location on the windward side of Britain meant that a naval attack could be launched there at any time, making it of extreme strategic military importance to Britain. From a British perspective, the situation needed to be contained. The solution the government of the day decided on was the plantation the north east of Ireland[ii].

The plantation (sometimes called “a settlement”) involved tens of thousands of British people being given land in the area now occupied by Northern Ireland. The idea being that, to quote Machiavelli in the Prince, “a prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new inhabitants.”[iii] In the case of Northern Ireland, Machiavelli was plainly wrong.

Over 300 years later at the beginning of the 20^th century, a minority of the Northern Ireland citizens (being Catholic) were still offended. To complicate matters further, the southern part of Ireland had gained its independence in 1921. Relations between the British leaning Protestants and Irish leaning Catholics deteriorated quite significantly in the years thereafter. By the 1960s, discrimination against Catholics culminated in gerrymandering, which in turn led to riots and the Northern Ireland civil rights movement. Sadly and ironically, the quest for civil rights for Catholics marked the beginning of an extended period of violence.

Between 1966 and 1998, two broad ethno-political groups (Protestant Unionists who wished to remain part of the UK and Catholic Republicans who wished to join the Republic of Ireland) embarked on a bloody tit-for-tat battle that would leave 3,600[iv] people dead and divide the two communities more than they had ever been before. As in all such conflicts, innocent people on both sides lost their lives and reasonable people were whittled down in number as the unreasonable became a majority. Treaties, agreements and ceasefires all came and went over the years but the violence dragged on.

Landslide Elections in Great Britain and Ireland

In 1997, landslide victories in the general elections of Great Britain[v] and Ireland[vi] brought Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern to power. Both leaders had made the ongoing crisis in Northern Ireland a priority of their election campaigns and the large majority that each had gave them a mandate to focus more attention on Northern Ireland than otherwise might have been the case. This was particularly true in the case of Blair, whose Labour Party had no presence in Northern Ireland[vii], meaning he had potentially more to lose than to gain in political terms.

In his autobiography, Blair devotes a chapter to the peace process that ensued in Northern Ireland. It is a fascinating insight into what was involved in overcoming the impasse there and the seeming impossibility of the task that confronted them: “A culture had grown up around the dispute. The Unionists didn’t simply have a disagreement with the Nationalists, nor simply a religious difference; they had different music a different way of speaking, a different attitude, a different nature…any theological dispute had long since been subsumed in the tribal one”[viii]

The tribal nature of the dispute also meant that the Unionists couldn’t be seen to be shaking hands with the Nationalists, lest it be seen as some form of pandering to terrorists. In a similar vein, when all-party talks began, negotiations between each side were usually held with them located in separate rooms. Meanwhile, outside negotiations, terrorist factions with links to political parties on both sides were being kept in the loop. The Secretary of State, Mo Mowlam, even made a point of visiting them in prison[ix] to include them in the process - another landmark.

In early April 1998, all parties involved in the process signed what became known as the Good Friday Agreement. It was ratified by elections in May of that year. This meant that the two sides of Northern Ireland, engulfed in tribalism, were beginning a shared government together; no more sitting in separate rooms in different wings of government buildings. It is irresponsible in cases such as this to suggest it was the triumph of hope over adversity; lessons can and should be learned from the Northern Ireland peace process. Broadly speaking, those lessons are the following:

1.      Core principles need to be established between all sides. In the case of Northern Ireland, both sides had irreconcilable differences in their views on whether it should remain in the UK or join the Republic of Ireland. The core principle established in Northern Ireland was the principle of consent – that only fair elections could decide its fate.

2.      Parties to the conflict needs outside assistance from a third party. If you keep doing things as you have always done them, you can expect the same results. A third-party with no agenda can bring a new perspective, new arguments and a new energy to an impasse.

3.      Negotiations need to be relentless. The Northern Ireland peace process was characterized by politicians effectively living in government buildings for days at a time, as details were thrashed out. A lack of urgency in many cases is to risk the lives of more innocent people.

4.      Consideration to details is crucial. This is not as soft an argument as it might appear. Small details in the Northern Ireland process such as the Irish language, army checkpoints and marching parades became bargaining chips[x]. Although at times they may have led to tangents, ultimately, all of them became part of a more holistic final agreement.

5.      There will be dissenters who don’t want to overcome the impasse. Generally, they will do what they can to disrupt negotiations. In the example of Northern Ireland, the largest atrocity came after the Easter Friday Agreement was signed in August 2008. Thankfully, it didn’t derail what had already been set in motion.

6.      The character of political leaders is important. For a political leader, it is not just about finding agreement with the other side, but convincing their own people to buy-in to the agreement. In the case of Northern Ireland, getting traditional hard-liners like Ian Paisley on the Unionist side and Gerry Adams on the Nationalist side to compromise was an extraordinary step, demanding real leadership from both. Likewise, Mo Mowlam taking the unprecedented step of negotiating with terrorist prisoners was a huge moment of leadership.

Conclusion

The most important element in any conflict resolution is a genuine desire on all sides to finish the conflict. No impasse in foreign policy has ever been overcome through peaceful means without this. Unfortunately, getting to a stage where this is desired often comes long after bloodshed and destruction have made people rethink their intransigence in favour of compromise. Northern Ireland’s history is an unfortunate reminder of this.

Lev Tolstoy’s quote that “all happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way,”[xi] applies very well to foreign policy impasses. The ultimate resolution of Northern Ireland’s conflict is not an exact template for every other of its kind. However, it does provide some useful general lessons that can and should be taken on elsewhere in the world. Most of all, it should send the message that no conflict is so intractable that a resolution can’t be found.

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[i] http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/good_friday_agreement

[ii] See: http://www.irishclub.org/Timeline%20for%20the%20Plantation%20of%20Ulster.pdf

[iii] Machiavelli, N., (1513), “The Prince.” Chapter 3: Concerning Mixed Principalities.

[iv] http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles

[v] http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/2/newsid_2480000/2480505.stm

[vi] http://electionresources.org/ie/house.php?election=1997

[vii] http://www.labour.org.uk/history_of_the_labour_party

[viii] Blair, T (2010). “The Journey: My Political Life.” ISBN-10: 0307390632. P. 148.

[ix] http://www.theguardian.com/politics/1998/jan/10/devolution.uk

[x] See Blair (2010) Chapter 6.

[xi] Tolstoy, L (1877). “Anna Karenina.” ISBN 9780191500374. Page unknown.