Showing posts with label Australia Banking Oligopoly. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Australia Banking Oligopoly. Show all posts

Saturday, August 1, 2015

Corporations’ exodus from traditional banking

In any discussion about corporate banking, it is important to remember that from the perspective of corporations, banks are a means and not an end. For example, what became apparent during the financial crisis that began in 2008 is that corporations tend to use banks as one of their funding options in times of duress. Evidence of this can be seen during the same period, when despite a dramatic fall in the quantity of new loans to large corporations of over 40%, banks’ balance sheets still experienced a spike in commerical and industrial loans (Sharfstein and Ivashina, 2010.)

At a time when credit was severely restricted, banks were able to leverage their relationships with banks to draw down existing credit lines and presumably achieve funding terms at better rates than had a relationship not been in place. Corporations may need to maintain these relationships if current figures are anything to go by. In the period after the financial crisis, a low growth environment combined with five years of near zero interest rates have incentivized corporations to increase their debts. As of the second quarter in 2015, corporate debt is at historically high levels: Net leverage for US companies, calculated as debt less cash as a multiple of annual income, was 1.88 at the end of 2014 – the same indicator was 1.63 on the eve of the financial crisis[1].

One of the consequences of the financial crisis for banks was the introduction of the Basel III framework, requiring banks to increase the level of low-risk high-quality capital on their balance sheets. One of the best means for banks to achieve this is through retaining corporate clients and their bulging cash reserves. Despite four hundred years of corporate banks existing, companies have yet to replace the deposit reserve function that those banks offer with anything better. This paper will outline several of the ways in which corporations are slowly moving away from banking insitutions and forwards some suggestions as to how banks can address this movement.

Bankers in the good old days.


Banks on the run
The recent and ongoing scandal involving the tax returns of US corporate giants was remarkable for several reasons. When a company such as Google pays tax of £11.2 million on receipts of £4.9 billion[2], plenty of comment will inevitably be generated. However, one of the most comment worthy facets of the story almost went unmentioned: the diminished role of banks in the process; aside from providing a medium (a bank account) where funds could be transferred from one jurisdiction to another, banks did nothing. The procedures were instead devised by these firms’ considerable financial teams and ‘big four’ accounting firms.

This is indicative of one of the many issues that banks currently face: corporations are not a captive audience; the services that they look for (M&A advisory, foreign exchange, tax consulting, etc.) are provided by a growing market of players at increasingly competitive prices. Corporations – aware of the large fees commanded by corporate banks and others for these services – have even began to develop teams within their walls which carry out the same functions. For example, in 2011, GE established a Latin America acquisition team whose role was to find and acquire attractive targets in Latin America[3].

The lines between banking and commerce have also blurred significantly. The Glass Steagall Act of 1933 banned the mixing of commerce and banking. In the United States, over time various parts of the act were either circumvented (as in the case of GE Finance) or repealed (as was the case in 1999[4]). As one Economist article[5] notes, ‘the case for a split is clear. Managers are even worse at dealing with financial risk than bankers are.’ Sceptics of companies taking over too many of the financial duties argue that managers of firms are better at dealing with issues like firm strategy and sales.

However, if the low-growth environment that corporations in the US and elsewhere currently find themselves in persists, it’s hard to see any way other than a gradual diminishing of the responsibilities assigned to corporate banks by their clients. Where there is an imperative from shareholders to ‘produce’ growth, firms can have the option of opting for M&A (risky), innovation (difficult to predict outcomes) or financial engineering, which more of them are turning to in greater numbers.
In this global climate, non-financial firms own $9 trillion of currency derivatives[6]. In China, low interest rates offered by corporate banks has led firms into shadow banking,[7] which offers higher returns but much less regulation than traditional corporate banking channels. In Brazil, corporate banks have effectively been crowded out by the national development bank, BNDES[8], which subsidizes financing for corporations at the expense of taxpayers. In 2014 alone, it borrowed $190m to corporations – 60% of them large multinationals – at an average rate of 5.5%[9] As of July 29th 2015, the interest rate set by the Central Bank of Brazil is 14.25%; it’s not easy for corporate banks to compete with such policy.
In India and elsewhere in Asia, companies are turning away from banks for funding and opting instead for commercial paper.[10] Bonds issued by first-time buyers have grown by close to 20% CAGR over the past five years. Presumably, this can have more dramatic consequences in places like India than in Anglo-Saxon countries, as close to half its 1.2 billion population don’t have regular bank accounts – amounting to far less cash on the balance sheets of banks to issue credit to corporations and others.
Even the largest company in the world by market cap has largely turned away from corporate banking; when the question arose ‘what is Apple going to do with its massive cash pile,’ the answer given by most analysts was to return the cash to stockholders through a buyback. Apple did that with some of the cash but most of it found its way to Braemore Capital in Nevada – a hedge fund which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Apple Inc. and now probably the biggest hedge fund in the world by assets under management[11].
The aforementioned discussion highlights many of the difficulties faced by banks and explains why the number of commercial banks startups has virtually dried up in the past decade. Since 1990, an average of nearly 200 banks were established per year in the United States. This number inevitably fell during the financial crisis and by 2011, no banks at all were founded[12] – the first time this happened since 1934 and the introduction of the Glass-Steagall Act. Compare this to the number of financial startups on private investor platform Angel List – at time of writing, the number of these startups was in excess of 4,500 with an average valuation of over $4 million – and you might begin to wonder if we’re witnessing the beginning of the end for corporate banking.
Corporate Banks: Fighting Back
What is notable about most corporate banks is their longevity. In a comparison between the average age of the oldest banks and the oldest non-financial companies, banks come out on top and by some distance. Well known multinational banks such as Bank of Scotland and Barclays were founded in the 17th century, while Bank of New York, Caja Madrid and JP Morgan Chase were all founded in the 18th century. By contrast, Cigna is the only publicly-listed firm in the United States which has survived in its original form from the 18th century.
Longevity matters for several reasons. Firstly, it shows the systemic importance of corporate banks, even if, as the figures in the introduction suggest, this importance is falling for the moment at least. Secondly, it shows that banks have always had accesss to large amounts of cash, which is one of the secrets of longevity, allowing them to see out downturns. Thirdly, and closely related to the second point, is that the tenets of corporate banking have not changed to the extent that most industries have in the past three centuries (although more on this later). Finally, to give some credit to modern corporate banks – it shows that they are above all, resourceful.
In terms of being resourceful, there are examples everywhere. For example, the average startup figures in the previous section can be a little misleading when it comes to corporate banks. One of the reason for the fall, not just in the number of startups but the number of existing banks, has been the huge consolidation that has occurred in the US banking industry since the 1980s. The current number of over 5,000 is around 40% of the total number of banks that existed in the United States since the 1980s. The United States isn’t alone. In countries as diverse as Sweden, Australia, China, Japan and Spain, the domestic banking sector is dominated by four banks.
Also, few industries have been shown to be as shrewd with legislation as corporate banks. Every financial crash is defined as much by the new raft of legislation as much as the aftermath of the crash itself. Corporate banks have learned to adapt to these changes quickly. Most of the major banks have capitalized their balance sheets well in advance of the deadline set by the Basel III regulations. This has also taught banks to develop lobbying. In April 2015, several large corporate banks announced they were increasing their lobbying spend in the EU; among them, JP Morgan Chase raised its costs from €50,000 in 2013 to €1,499,999 in 2014, while Goldman Sachs’ rose from €50,000 to €799,999 and UBS rose from €200,000 to €1.7  million[13].  
This lobbying doesn’t just give sway to banks – it can also lend influence to their largest clients. There’s a real unspoken element here of how it’s better for corporations to be onside with banks and to piggybank on some of their lobbying. Leaders of the large banks effectively become spokesmen for heads of industry – and not just the banking industry – at the government table. There is probably little that financial innovation can do to change this, providing another reason why most banks will still be around long after many of today’s largest corporations.



[1] http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-firms-shoulder-rising-debt-1430689085
[2] http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c6ff0ebc-29c4-11e3-bbb8-00144feab7de.html#axzz3h3liUxx1
[3] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-04-29/general-electric-starts-m-a-team-in-latin-america-as-regional-orders-surge
[4] http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/08/27/repeal-of-glass-steagall-caused-the-financial-crisis
[7] http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2015/3/31/china/are-chinas-shadow-banks-going-bring-economy-down
[8] Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento
[11] http://qz.com/393093/the-mysterious-fund-in-the-desert-that-manages-apples-cash/
[13] https://euobserver.com/institutional/128520

Sunday, June 1, 2014

Australia's Banking Oligopoly


Markets which are categorized as oligopolies are distinguished by few sellers offering near identical products. Typically, these markets have high barriers to entry and exit, while the behaviour of each firm depends on the predicted behaviour of the other firms in the market. Taking these criteria into consideration, it is fundamentally clear that the Australian banking system is an oligopoly. The “big four” in Australia (being National Australia Bank, Commonwealth Bank, Westpac and the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group) dominate the domestic banking industry.

It is not unusual for a nation’s banking system to be an oligopoly. Given the characteristics of banking and how it lends itself to better-known names, economies of scale and small margins at the retail level, it is somewhat inevitable. Australia is not alone in having a “big 4” banking oligopoly. Similar oligopolies exist in countries ranging from Ireland to Sweden to China.  Even a study by Beck and co. in 2003[i] cited the examples of Norway and Finland – considered in anecdotal terms to be equitable societies with well-functioning economies – whose largest 3 banks had industry concentrations of 84% and 85% respectively.

In the same study, the authors note that high concentration in itself is not necessarily a bad characteristic for a banking industry to possess. They note that high concentration leads to high stability in the banking industry. In particular, they noted that a concentration level of 72% or above could be directly correlated with fewer occurrences of banking failures within the particular country. They argue that large banks are easily diversified, which allows them to spread risk (and therefore, attain lower overall risk) across several sectors of the banking industry. Also, the authors state that a concentrated group of bigger banks should be easier to monitor than a fragmented group of smaller banks.

In addition, a report in Australian Banking and Finance from late 2013[ii] notes that the big 4 banks in Australia, have “scale advantages, cost advantages, efficiency advantages, investment advantages, capital advantages – flowing from their ability to use internal ratings based capital allocation against assets, funding advantages, competitive advantages and so on.” The report also states that they dominate in an oligopoly that gives them “a durable structural competitive advantage.”

That is not to suggest, however, that the oligopoly was a planned measure by bureaucrats with a long-term vision for the Australian banking system. Like most other countries experiencing similar levels of concentration in the banking industry, Australia’s oligopoly came about through a long process – central to which was deregulation.

Giving Historical Context to the Australian Banking Oligopoly
The Australia Institute Paper of 2012, “The Rise and Rise of the Big Banks,” examines deregulation of the Australian financial system in some detail. This process began in the early1970s and continued right until the early 2000s, by which time the industry had undergone extensive change. Predictably, the major outcome of this change was huge consolidation in the banking industry in particular. The paper notes that in the 1980s, banks controlled around 50% of the financial industry but currently, that figure stands at around 90%.

Banks, which were previously rather one-dimensional entities, through a long process of deregulation started by the Hawke government at the beginning of the 1980s, have swallowed up other niches in the financial system, which catered for different niches, such as credit unions, building societies and financial co-operatives. The government and the central bank decided to move away from the old system in the 1970s for a few reasons[iii]:

i)              To allow banks to better respond to consumer needs. At the time, banks were losing market share in the financial system, falling to as low as 40% from a previous high of 70% in the 1950s.
ii)             To make the financial system (slightly?) more centralized and thus, easier to regulate.
iii)            To allow banking authorities to engage in large foreign exchange transactions and better manage domestic liquidity by stabilizing the foreign exchange rate.
iv)           To bring greater efficiency to the financial system in terms of better interest spreads, innovation and access to credit lines.

All of the aims were achieved with varying degrees of success. Point (ii) does raise the question about where regulation should have stepped in once more to stop the oligopoly of banks arising. Whereas the debate in other countries has centred round how to diminish the influence of banking institutions (and therefore, their size) in Australia, 24 years of solid growth has led many people in places of political power to believe that the oligopoly that exists may be more of a strength than a weakness.

Political Support for Oligopoly in Australia
Whereas the political class might be expected to oppose oligopolies (and probably do when the moment suits), the success of the Australian banks seems only to have made them national champions in the eyes of the country’s politicians. In August 2013, opposition finance spokesman Andrew Robb courted controversy when he claimed to support oligopoly in the financial industry. He told one delegation, “we are an oligopoly community. We shouldn’t fight it. We should make the most of it. It does provide us with the critical mass and the size and innovation and for that ability to compete with overseas countries.”[iv]

There might be something to Andre Robb’s comments, rather than just point-scoring with the powerful financial industry (which is three times the size of Australia’s GDP). Australia has given rise to oligopolies in a number of industries. Could it be that its size (and lack of any natural competitors from outside, being an island) is a factor in determining oligopolies in each industry? The media, grocery and telecoms industries are also characterized by oligopolies (although a system fault in any of the others would not be as catastrophic as one would be for the banking industry).

Nevertheless, the political support extends from politicians themselves to the central bank, the Royal Bank of Australia. This semi-political institution, has – in the words on one Australian commentator – “bent over backwards during the last 24 months to defend the concentration of Australia’s banking market.”[v] It seems a consensus has been reached between government and the Royal Bank of Australia that because Australia avoided the brunt of the global financial crisis and its banks in particular remained unscathed, that the banking system is fine in its current oligopoly form. They seem to be saying that if it’s not broken, don’t fix it.

While Australia’s banking system as at 2014 is lightly regulated, policymakers could well benefit from looking at financial crises in various countries in the past five years and learn from them. In this case, the adage “prevention is better than cure” may be more appropriate than “if it’s not broken, don’t fix it.” For example, the report into the Australian banking system conducted by the Australia Institute in 2012[vi], begins, “the Australian banking industry is the most concentrated in the world and also the most profitable. In fact, the ‘big four’ Australian banks make up four of the eight most profitable banks in the world.”

It’s not difficult to see why there are such large profits at the “Big 4” Australian banks, when one considers how they have shared up the market between them (see Table 1 below).



The same paper mentions that, “examinations of the top 20 shareholders of the banks’ annual reports shows that, on average, over 53% of each big bank is owned by shareholders that are among the top 20 shareholders in all of the big banks.” Further evidence in the report shows that the next biggest banks exhibit similar shareholder stakes. It could be suggested that this points to more of a monopoly than an oligopoly. In addition, all their business models are nearly identical (relying on wholesale loans for most of their business), giving further weight to the existence of an effective oligopoly.

Consequences of Australia’s Banking Industry Oligopoly
As with any industry, high industry concentration in banking leads to low levels of competition and higher prices (i.e., the consumer stands to lose out). In addition, higher interest rates are often the by-product of high levels of bank concentration. The 2009 best-seller, Too Big to Fail by Andre Ross Sorkin chartered the catastrophe occurred when a highly deregulated banking system becomes too centralized within a small numbers of banks. Australia escaped the brunt of the global financial crisis not because of financial prescience, but rather because it was (and still is to a lesser extent) undergoing a mineral extraction boom. It is important not to forget this in the context of the banking system in particular.

A 2012 IMF report which examined Australia’s financial industry[vii] noted: “a higher capital threshold for the systemically important institutions may be desirable to further bolster financial system stability. The four major banks are systemically important, which imposes a negative externality on the domestic financial system. Significant and protracted difficulties in any one of them would have sever repercussions for the entire financial system and in turn, the real economy.”

The report goes on to state, “the Basel Committee considers it appropriate for supervisory authorities to conduct more intensive supervision and require additional capital of systemically important institutions.” Elsewhere in its recommendations, the IMF Report that there is a moral hazard inherent in having such a highly concentrated banking sector. This mirrors the concerns it laid out about the American banking sector before the financial crash in August 2008. It suggests some ex-ante funded deposit insurance, which the banks should put up themselves.

The issue here is that what the IMF is suggesting goes against the grain of what Australian banks and the financial regulator are doing. The oligopoly in the Australian banking system will likely cause some problems for the economy further down the line. As we have seen, there exists a clear oligopoly, which has been under-regulated and may begin to over-compete with itself in order to gain market share in a market which will stop growing sooner or later.

As for breaking up the banking oligopoly? It would seem that Australia has learned little from the experience of America. In November 2013, the government launched a “root and branch” review of the Australian financial system[viii] (i.e. its banking system). The aim of this review is to “make recommendations to foster an efficient, competitive and flexible financial system, consistent with financial stability, prudence, integrity and fairness.” Notably, these are not typically traits associated with an oligopoly. The review will be headed by none other than David Murray, the former chief of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, one of the Big 4. This is analogous to Goldman Sachs officials running the Federal Reserve at the time of the US financial crash. Plus ça change.













[i] Bank Concentration and Crises, NBER Working Paper 9921, Beck, Kunt and Devine (2003).
[ii] http://www.australianbankingfinance.com/banking/major-banks-enjoy-structural-advantage/
[iii] http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2007/sp-dg-160707.html
[iv] http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/companies/we-are-an-oligopoly-economy-robb/story-fn91v9q3-1226699531519#
[v] http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2010/5/21/interest-rates/time-blast-banking-oligopoly
[vi] The Rise and Rise of the Big Banks, Technical Brief No. 15, The Australia Institute, December 2012.
[vii] Australia: Financial system stability report. IMF Country Report No. 12/308, November 2012.
[viii] http://www.smh.com.au/business/the-economy/former-cba-chief-david-murray-to-head-review-20131121-2xwdp.html

The Australian Banking System is an Oligopoly



Oligopoly is a well-defined theory of economics that needs little introduction. All economists from Keynesians to Classicists agree on its parameters. Put simply, it is “a situation in which a particular market is controlled by a small number of firms. An oligopoly is much like a monopoly, in which one company exerts control over most of a market. In an oligopoly, there are at least 2 firms controlling the market.”[1] Even to an outsider of economics, this appears to describe well what has happened inside the Australian banking system with the “four pillars.”
The Four Pillars

The “four pillars” is a name given to the four banks that dominate the Australian Banking sector. These are, in descending order of size, the Commonwealth Bank, Westpac Banking Corporation, the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group and the National Australia Bank. The “four pillars” name conveys importance – and indeed, the banks are of significant importance to the stability of the Australian economy at large – but given their similarity to each other, the banks might well be known as the “four sisters.”

By any stretch of the term, the “four pillars” operate in a virtually unchallenged oligopoly, controlling between them around 80% of the Australian banking sector at any one time. The issue is a constant topic of discussion (and grievance) in the Australian media (one article referred to them as the “four pillows”), who note that the banks have become omnipotent since deregulation of the finance industry occurred at the beginning of the 1980s, after the by-now infamous Campbell Report (1981).

How the Oligopoly was Created

Deregulation of the Australian financial system began in the early 1980s. Its primary goal was to stabilize the Australian economy (which was doing badly at the time) and put Australian banks on a more even footing with their international peers. The steps taken to achieve this in the initial phase of deregulation were the free-float of the Australian dollar and the abolition of direct interest rates and portfolio controls for banks and other financial institutions at the end of 1983, issuing new foreign exchange licenses in 1984 and granting foreign bank licenses in 1985.

Assessing these reforms is difficult. Likewise, try to establish if deregulation was in fact responsible for the breakaway group of four large banks in Australia is almost impossible to tell. Giving banks the ability to compete on a level playing field with international competitors is no bad thing in itself, of course. And allowing the Australian dollar to free-float is in line with most economies around the world. That is not to say that the process happened without anyone observing.

A series of mergers (mergers are almost always acquisitions) occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, which, at least in part led to the oligopoly that the Australian banking system now plays host to.  National and regional governments allowed their own savings banks (such as the NSW bank or the State Bank of South Australia, for example) to be purchased by larger commercial banks, in a series of bolt-on acquisitions. I believe now – although it is easy to be wise after the fact – that these acquisitions should not have been given the go-ahead by the competition authority, as they were sowing the seeds for the oligopoly now evident in the sector.

Assessing Oligopolies
That banking in Australia is an oligopoly is hardly surprising. In his book, Principles of Economics (2008), Gregory Mankiw gives examples of oligopolies that exist in various industries in the United States based on figures provided by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Federal Trade Commission. The list is extensive. It includes breakfast cereal with a concentration of 92%[2], soft drinks with a concentration of 93%, and beer, with a concentration of 85%. These figures at least show that banking is not alone as an oligopoly.

Given that so many industries take the structure of oligopolies, why is there such an issue when banking takes a similar market structure? In short, the answer is that banks most likely play the role of scapegoats. They become an easy target for everything that is ill with the economy. 

The Herald Sun neatly captures this in one of its opinion pieces from August 2008:[3]
“Kevin Rudd[4]  goes for a crowd favourite – greedy bankers:
Kevin Rudd stands accused of bank-bashing after vowing to penalise financial institutions that lavish executives with multi-million-dollar pay packages without requiring them to follow responsible investment practises.
Mr. Rudd has asked the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority to prepare rules penalising banks that reward risky behaviour by requiring them to have greater capital reserves than those with more responsible investment practises.
…How the crowd hoots!”

The reality is that oligopolies – in the banking industry or otherwise - aren’t as bad as the media and others would like to portray. A cursory glance at interest rates offered by the “four pillars” shows that they offer consumers a reasonably good spread of interest rates on loans over the same period[5]. By the principles of an oligopoly, all would be striving to offer as small a spread as possible. I still contend that the Australian banking system is an oligopoly but that it is in fact quickly heading towards a monopoly.

In 2012, the range between the market capitalizations of each of the four pillars varied between $30bn and $35bn. As of May 2014, the range is over $51bn, with the Commonweath Bank opening up a considerable distance between its valuation and that of the National Australia Bank (see chart on next page) Likewise, in 2012, the range between the leading two banks, Commonwealth Bank and Westpac Banking Corporation was approximately $20bn. It is now $25bn.

Bank
Market Cap (May 2014)
Commonwealth Bank
$130bn
Westpac Banking Corporation
$105bn
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group
$91bn
National Australia Bank
$79bn
Source: Bloomberg
An Increasing Need for Regulation
The “four pillars” which began as “the six pillars” (when it included Australia’s two large insurance firms), seem sacred to successive governments in Australia. Various excuses are given for the sanctity of the four. The latest on record was given by the head of the current government’s financial system inquiry, David Murray, whose reasoning goes: “if you relax the four pillars policy and went to three, inevitably in some unforeseen circumstance you would finish up having to go to two. And at two, there is definitely a too big to fail question.” So much for sound economic analysis.

What Murray and others in government consistently fail to recognize is that countries which suffered massive banking crises in the not-too-distant past all had banking oligopolies which, in fact, were less concentrated than Australia’s (Australia’s being the most concentrated banking sector in the world)[6]. Given this is the case, it would seem like negligence to ignore the fact that Australia’s banking industry is need of a regulatory shake-up. However, despite the glaring need, there is still opposition from the big four and even the financial regulator in Australia.

When the IMF provided an assessment of Australia’s big 4 in November 2012, the response from those in Australia was predictably hostile. After suggesting in the report that the big 4 should possibly hold more capital to further bolster financial system stability, “Australian Prudential Regulation Authority chairman John Laker and ANZ’s John Morschel rejected the finding, and Westpac’s Lindsay Maxsted warned the banking industry risked becoming globally uncompetitive if there was a further increase in capital requirements.”[7] Anyone who has taken a look at the Australian banking sector would know that these individuals aren’t overly concerned with competition. Capital requirements often have leaders of the banking industry come over in a fit of competitive spirit, however. The IMF’s report was also met with the common lambast that Australian banks are “amongst the most highly capitalized in the world.”

Further Down the Road
As I have pointed out elsewhere in this paper, Australia’s banking industry is not only an oligopoly but it appears to be heading towards a monopoly (or at least a duopoly). The financial industry, which is now a few times the size of Australian GDP (admittedly not unusual for most countries´ financial sector) is in desperate need of regulation. There exists a good chance that the gulf between the largest bank in the “four pillars” will open up a bigger and bigger gap between itself and the fourth biggest of the group.

The popular media in Australia often mentions politicians and financial leaders talking about the need to be competitive internationally (as Australia’s banks seek to tie up business abroad), but this ignores the fact that Australia avoids many banking crises by the very fact that it hasn’t been closely linked to the global financial system until now. By becoming more intertwined with outside banking systems, its risks become more systemic.

Australia’s authorities have failed to see that these banks are already “too big to fail.” By allowing them to grow in the same manner in which they have been until now is negligent on their part. The fifth biggest bank by assets is only around a quarter of the size of the fourth[8], meaning the hegemony is unlikely to be broken anytime soon. The Australian government needs to take action in one of any number of ways. Among potential measures which they could take are:

i)             Higher capital controls for the four pillars than other banks. In this manner, at least other banks are given an incentive to play “catch up.”
ii)            Higher capital controls for all banks, thereby making the system safer, although possibly doing little to break up the existing oligopoly.
iii)           Allow a foreign bank to take over one of the four pillars. This is probably too politically unpopular to ever happen now.
iv)           Nationalize and merge some smaller banks to create a fifth pillar.
v)            Re-regulate some sections of the financial system, such as funds, to encourage new business startup and banks to break off sections of their businesses.

Conclusion
I believe that the seeds for Australia’s banking system oligopoly were sown in the 1980s by a series of government bank sell-offs. From my reading of the literature, there was little strategy behind these sell-offs with no thought given to the consequences of what the purchase of these assets by larger commercial banks would mean for the banking system. Those changes occurred and are now impossible to undo. Given this, regulators need to look at some changes to implement before the banks’ oligopoly becomes any more dangerous to the economy at large.

The reality is that none of the measures I have suggested here are likely to be given the go ahead (with the exception of higher capital controls and probably only after it is too late). Australia’s banking system is clearly an oligopoly and becoming more entrenched in that position as time goes on. Its regulators and politicians need to force through some changes in the financial industry before it becomes the latest textbook example of how a country whose regulators failed to react to the signs before it was too late.








[1] Taken from: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/oligopoly.asp
[2] Meaning that the top 4 producers have a concentration of this amount.
[3] http://blogs.news.com.au/heraldsun/andrewbolt/index.php/heraldsun/comments/bash_the_greedy_scapegoat/P80/
[4] Then Prime Minister of Australia
[5] http://australia.deposits.org/
[6] http://www.tai.org.au/node/1926
[7] http://www.clmr.unsw.edu.au/article/risk/imf-reports-australias-high-compliance-international-standards-raises-concerns-over-market
[8]