Showing posts with label Banking. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Banking. Show all posts

Saturday, August 1, 2015

Corporations’ exodus from traditional banking

In any discussion about corporate banking, it is important to remember that from the perspective of corporations, banks are a means and not an end. For example, what became apparent during the financial crisis that began in 2008 is that corporations tend to use banks as one of their funding options in times of duress. Evidence of this can be seen during the same period, when despite a dramatic fall in the quantity of new loans to large corporations of over 40%, banks’ balance sheets still experienced a spike in commerical and industrial loans (Sharfstein and Ivashina, 2010.)

At a time when credit was severely restricted, banks were able to leverage their relationships with banks to draw down existing credit lines and presumably achieve funding terms at better rates than had a relationship not been in place. Corporations may need to maintain these relationships if current figures are anything to go by. In the period after the financial crisis, a low growth environment combined with five years of near zero interest rates have incentivized corporations to increase their debts. As of the second quarter in 2015, corporate debt is at historically high levels: Net leverage for US companies, calculated as debt less cash as a multiple of annual income, was 1.88 at the end of 2014 – the same indicator was 1.63 on the eve of the financial crisis[1].

One of the consequences of the financial crisis for banks was the introduction of the Basel III framework, requiring banks to increase the level of low-risk high-quality capital on their balance sheets. One of the best means for banks to achieve this is through retaining corporate clients and their bulging cash reserves. Despite four hundred years of corporate banks existing, companies have yet to replace the deposit reserve function that those banks offer with anything better. This paper will outline several of the ways in which corporations are slowly moving away from banking insitutions and forwards some suggestions as to how banks can address this movement.

Bankers in the good old days.


Banks on the run
The recent and ongoing scandal involving the tax returns of US corporate giants was remarkable for several reasons. When a company such as Google pays tax of £11.2 million on receipts of £4.9 billion[2], plenty of comment will inevitably be generated. However, one of the most comment worthy facets of the story almost went unmentioned: the diminished role of banks in the process; aside from providing a medium (a bank account) where funds could be transferred from one jurisdiction to another, banks did nothing. The procedures were instead devised by these firms’ considerable financial teams and ‘big four’ accounting firms.

This is indicative of one of the many issues that banks currently face: corporations are not a captive audience; the services that they look for (M&A advisory, foreign exchange, tax consulting, etc.) are provided by a growing market of players at increasingly competitive prices. Corporations – aware of the large fees commanded by corporate banks and others for these services – have even began to develop teams within their walls which carry out the same functions. For example, in 2011, GE established a Latin America acquisition team whose role was to find and acquire attractive targets in Latin America[3].

The lines between banking and commerce have also blurred significantly. The Glass Steagall Act of 1933 banned the mixing of commerce and banking. In the United States, over time various parts of the act were either circumvented (as in the case of GE Finance) or repealed (as was the case in 1999[4]). As one Economist article[5] notes, ‘the case for a split is clear. Managers are even worse at dealing with financial risk than bankers are.’ Sceptics of companies taking over too many of the financial duties argue that managers of firms are better at dealing with issues like firm strategy and sales.

However, if the low-growth environment that corporations in the US and elsewhere currently find themselves in persists, it’s hard to see any way other than a gradual diminishing of the responsibilities assigned to corporate banks by their clients. Where there is an imperative from shareholders to ‘produce’ growth, firms can have the option of opting for M&A (risky), innovation (difficult to predict outcomes) or financial engineering, which more of them are turning to in greater numbers.
In this global climate, non-financial firms own $9 trillion of currency derivatives[6]. In China, low interest rates offered by corporate banks has led firms into shadow banking,[7] which offers higher returns but much less regulation than traditional corporate banking channels. In Brazil, corporate banks have effectively been crowded out by the national development bank, BNDES[8], which subsidizes financing for corporations at the expense of taxpayers. In 2014 alone, it borrowed $190m to corporations – 60% of them large multinationals – at an average rate of 5.5%[9] As of July 29th 2015, the interest rate set by the Central Bank of Brazil is 14.25%; it’s not easy for corporate banks to compete with such policy.
In India and elsewhere in Asia, companies are turning away from banks for funding and opting instead for commercial paper.[10] Bonds issued by first-time buyers have grown by close to 20% CAGR over the past five years. Presumably, this can have more dramatic consequences in places like India than in Anglo-Saxon countries, as close to half its 1.2 billion population don’t have regular bank accounts – amounting to far less cash on the balance sheets of banks to issue credit to corporations and others.
Even the largest company in the world by market cap has largely turned away from corporate banking; when the question arose ‘what is Apple going to do with its massive cash pile,’ the answer given by most analysts was to return the cash to stockholders through a buyback. Apple did that with some of the cash but most of it found its way to Braemore Capital in Nevada – a hedge fund which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Apple Inc. and now probably the biggest hedge fund in the world by assets under management[11].
The aforementioned discussion highlights many of the difficulties faced by banks and explains why the number of commercial banks startups has virtually dried up in the past decade. Since 1990, an average of nearly 200 banks were established per year in the United States. This number inevitably fell during the financial crisis and by 2011, no banks at all were founded[12] – the first time this happened since 1934 and the introduction of the Glass-Steagall Act. Compare this to the number of financial startups on private investor platform Angel List – at time of writing, the number of these startups was in excess of 4,500 with an average valuation of over $4 million – and you might begin to wonder if we’re witnessing the beginning of the end for corporate banking.
Corporate Banks: Fighting Back
What is notable about most corporate banks is their longevity. In a comparison between the average age of the oldest banks and the oldest non-financial companies, banks come out on top and by some distance. Well known multinational banks such as Bank of Scotland and Barclays were founded in the 17th century, while Bank of New York, Caja Madrid and JP Morgan Chase were all founded in the 18th century. By contrast, Cigna is the only publicly-listed firm in the United States which has survived in its original form from the 18th century.
Longevity matters for several reasons. Firstly, it shows the systemic importance of corporate banks, even if, as the figures in the introduction suggest, this importance is falling for the moment at least. Secondly, it shows that banks have always had accesss to large amounts of cash, which is one of the secrets of longevity, allowing them to see out downturns. Thirdly, and closely related to the second point, is that the tenets of corporate banking have not changed to the extent that most industries have in the past three centuries (although more on this later). Finally, to give some credit to modern corporate banks – it shows that they are above all, resourceful.
In terms of being resourceful, there are examples everywhere. For example, the average startup figures in the previous section can be a little misleading when it comes to corporate banks. One of the reason for the fall, not just in the number of startups but the number of existing banks, has been the huge consolidation that has occurred in the US banking industry since the 1980s. The current number of over 5,000 is around 40% of the total number of banks that existed in the United States since the 1980s. The United States isn’t alone. In countries as diverse as Sweden, Australia, China, Japan and Spain, the domestic banking sector is dominated by four banks.
Also, few industries have been shown to be as shrewd with legislation as corporate banks. Every financial crash is defined as much by the new raft of legislation as much as the aftermath of the crash itself. Corporate banks have learned to adapt to these changes quickly. Most of the major banks have capitalized their balance sheets well in advance of the deadline set by the Basel III regulations. This has also taught banks to develop lobbying. In April 2015, several large corporate banks announced they were increasing their lobbying spend in the EU; among them, JP Morgan Chase raised its costs from €50,000 in 2013 to €1,499,999 in 2014, while Goldman Sachs’ rose from €50,000 to €799,999 and UBS rose from €200,000 to €1.7  million[13].  
This lobbying doesn’t just give sway to banks – it can also lend influence to their largest clients. There’s a real unspoken element here of how it’s better for corporations to be onside with banks and to piggybank on some of their lobbying. Leaders of the large banks effectively become spokesmen for heads of industry – and not just the banking industry – at the government table. There is probably little that financial innovation can do to change this, providing another reason why most banks will still be around long after many of today’s largest corporations.



[1] http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-firms-shoulder-rising-debt-1430689085
[2] http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c6ff0ebc-29c4-11e3-bbb8-00144feab7de.html#axzz3h3liUxx1
[3] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-04-29/general-electric-starts-m-a-team-in-latin-america-as-regional-orders-surge
[4] http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/08/27/repeal-of-glass-steagall-caused-the-financial-crisis
[7] http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2015/3/31/china/are-chinas-shadow-banks-going-bring-economy-down
[8] Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento
[11] http://qz.com/393093/the-mysterious-fund-in-the-desert-that-manages-apples-cash/
[13] https://euobserver.com/institutional/128520

Friday, November 7, 2014

Factors Influencing the Debt of Public-Private Partnership Projects in Italy

The Public-Private Partnership is by no means a new concept. Its origins can be found in early government concessions in China, granted for salt and iron mining about 2,000 years ago, according to the author, Gernet (1982). However, the phenomenon was only formalized in as late as the 18th century in France by the Public Works Concession (Concession de Travaux Publiques). Subsequently, it became a turn-to solution for large infrastructure projects for several succeeding governments in Western Europe, America and Asia.

However, despite the relative popularity of the Public-Private Partnerships, their arrival in Italy has been relatively recent. Rossi and Civitillo (2013) contend that these projects were first formalized in Italy in 1994 through what has become known as the Merloni Law. Since then as Figure 1 below illustrates, the popularity of Public-Private Partnerships has been on a general upward trend, both in terms of the number or projects undertaken and the collective annual outlay on these projects.

Figure 1. Italian Public-Private Partnerships, 2002-2012
Source: As noted on graph.

As noted above, Public-Private Partnerships, despite their ongoing popularity as a means of financing public infrastructure projects, are a relatively late arrival to the scene in Italy, having existed elsewhere for several decades. The reasons for the late arrival of the concept in Italy are difficult to ascertain. It is possible that one factor in the 20th century at least, was the frequency at which governments changed in Italy during the same century but the cost of government debt undoubtedly also played a role.

Figure 2 below depicts the trend of the cost of Italian debt since 1950. For the majority of the second half of the 20th century in Italy, real interest rates (that is, interest after inflation) were negative, effectively providing an incentive for successive governments to invest in public infrastructure rather than issue private contracts to do so. However, as the cost of issuing debt reached its apex in 1994 at the time that Public Private Partnerships were beginning in Italy, it’s reasonable to make an assumption that the cost of debt was a major factor here.

Figure 2. Italian Interest Rates, 1950-2012

Source: Banco d’Italia

In fact, the cost of debt is of the utmost relevance to this paper. Most Public-Private Partnerships are only around 10-15% funded by the SPV, which leaves a large proportion of the money to be made up by financial institutions such as banks – the focus of this paper. In particular, the paper will analyse how debt issued by banks (especially senior debt) is affected by the following variables:
-          Size of the Main Partner
-          Length of concession period
-          Interest rates on date of financial close
-          Solidity of the Main Partner
The paper will thereafter make a number of reasonable assumptions about how these variables usually affect the provision of debt for the Public Private Partnership.

At the outset, it is worth noting that the scale of the projects undertaken by Public-Private Partnerships are generally large enough to attract the attention of international financial institutions and not just Italian banks and financiers. This is also one of the tenets of the European Union - that all public projects are put to tender on an EU-wide basis. In theory at least, this ensures competition and transparency in the union and arguably creating a more efficient marketplace for infrastructure projects.

The implications for the EU-wide tender go beyond competition, efficiency and transparency, however. From an Italian perspective, it means that, on the government side (the “Public” in the Public-Private” equation), the Italian government at the time of the project in question is effectively competing with other countries’ infrastructure projects. In other words, when the NHS is looking for VFM (“value for money”) in its projects in the UK (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003), this too has consequences for projects seeking financing in Italy.

Regarding the financial aspect of Public-Private Projects, Rossi and Civitillo (2013) note, “the funding of public-private partnership projects in Italy is generally granted by banks and rarely by capital market by selling bonds or shares to investors. Using such a kind of funding gives disadvantages in comparison with other countries: the interest rate is about 10-11%, while in the UK, for instance, the spread on the risk-free rate is about 0.75 – 1%.” The authors also note that Italian banks tend to ask for traditional guarantees for the financing.

The authors go on to note that the Italian government doesn’t use VFM as the UK government prescribes, but rather an “Economic-Financial Plan” – a financial model put together by the private side. This suggests that the process isn’t as transparent as it should be in Italy and that considerations beyond the size of the tender bid by the private (financing side) are potentially being given too much weight but the issue of transparency is not within the scope of this paper.

The paper will begin with a discussion surrounding some of the main theories of the use of debt in project financing – with a focus on Public-Private Partnerships. This is an area of the academic field which is still relatively new but is growing in line with the industry itself. This will be followed by analysis of what role the variables mentioned above (size, solidity, duration of concession period and interest rates) play in the issuance of debt for Public-Private Partnerships in Italy.

The Role of Banks in Italian Public-Private Partnerships
Banking institutions are the predominant form of finance for Public-Private Partnerships in Italy. It is somewhat difficult to ascertain why this is the case, given that the Italian debt market is the third largest of its kind in the world.[1] This could be related to the flexibility of bank financing relative to that of bond financing, its low cost and importantly to some SPVs, its low disclosure requirements (whereas Bond financing requires a public listing and much higher disclosure).

The predominant use of bank financing for Italian Public-Private Partnerships at least means, that for the purpose of research, the form of financing Italian Public-Private Partnerships can practically be simplified to banking institutions. Akintoye and Chinyio (2001) suggest the following structure for PFI (Public Finance Initiatives) – type projects.

Figure 3. PFI Model Structure (Akintoye and Chinyio, 2001)


It’s important to note here that the bank is the senior debt provider. This is generally the case but not always. This is an important point to remember with these projects, which are often not as liquid as smaller investments which might be part-funded by banks. Collateral in the form of a bridge or road project, for example, might not be attractive to banks which have provided funding for the project in question.

The nature of Italian Public-Private Partnerships (small population of projects relative to other countries, infrequent use of capital markets for financing, lack of transparency in the tender process) means that the task of analysing how debt is issued by banks is made more difficult. Nonetheless, this paper will put forward several justifiable theories as to what factors underlie the process. In turn, the factors to be analysed are: risk, firm size, the length of concession period and the interest rates on date of financial close.

Firm Size as a Factor in Banks’ Willingness to Issue Debt for PPP
In a sample of 75 Public-Private Partnerships (see appendix 1), what is notable how large the firms’ are in terms of market size. The reasons for this could be manifold, including existing relationships between banks and these firms, a long track record of large infrastructure projects having been delivered by these firms, the criteria of the project demanding larger private partners or just a lack of smaller firms competing for the tenders of the Public-Private Partnership projects in the sample.

In the 75 projects sample mentioned above, the average firm was several billion euro in terms of market capital (where some firms were the main private partner on more than one project). This would comfortably put these firms in the top decile of firms in the European Union and would suggest that firm size is a highly important factor when banks are deciding whether to issue debt for the project. Particularly given that some of the project sizes could feasibly be taken on by much smaller firms.

Regarding how smaller firms could take on many of the projects in the sample; this is confirmed by running a correlation between the main partner firm size and the debt required for each project. There is virtually no correlation at all between the two.This would seem to give further weight to the theory that banking institutions prefer when the main partner is a large company.

The sample of 75 projects is almost entirely populated by projects where the main partner is an Italian firm. There are some exceptions, however. These are provided by Barclays Bank, the Sunpower Corporation and the Foresight Group. While the Foresight Group is estimated to have a shareholder equity value of €60m, Barclays and Sunpower Corporation are among the largest firms on the list, suggesting that when banks do look to foreign partners, the size of those foreign partners is a major consideration.

Likewise, Akintoye et al (2001) note that “the credit risk associated with the borrower is of little importance and the finance must be judged almost entirely on the basis of the risks that may threaten the project completion and operation.” This would suggest that, where funding banks are concerned, a track record is highly important. Larger firms, all things being equal, will tend to have longer track records than smaller firms, thus providing further inclination for banks to provide debt to them over smaller firms.

As a final consideration, it is more difficult to ascertain the importance of this particular measure (firm size) in banks’ decisions to fund the Public-Private Partnership without access to competing bids (i.e. those that bid but did not win the tender). The true measure of the importance of firm size in banks’ decisions to provide debt or not would require the full list of applicant firms for each project, along with their estimated firm size.

Length of Concession Period as a Factor in Banks’ Willingness to Issue Debt for PPP
Although the length of the concession period is technically part of the risk profile of each project, there is more at play from a banks’ perspective than just risk when it is being considered. There are potential agency problems, issues about capital ratios and considerations to be made on how they view the long term interest rate curve. In fact, the interest rate curve has to be a major decision for banks in looking at the length of the concession period for each project.

The interest rate curve can tell banks a lot about which medium- to longer-term (as projects in Public-Private Partnerships tend to be). The interest rate curve at any particular time should offer a good indicator of whether banks will offer for longer-term projects or not. Typically, they would face an upward facing interest rate curve (that is, interest rates in the longer term are normal) whereas at times – such as during the recent global financial crisis – they will face a flat interest curve, indicating ongoing uncertainty in the financial industry and probably some reluctance to become involved in projects with longer concession periods.

From a banking perspective, the disadvantage of many Public-Private Partnership projects it that the length of the concession period can potentially create agency problems that might not otherwise appear in shorter-term projects. These are the same agency problems that are created by mortgages; bank management often do not have the time in office that it takes for the projects to be realized, so there is some misalignment between the duration of management and that of the debt being issued.

The concession period of a bank’s existing stock of loans should also be a factor in their decision to provide debt or not. Banks don’t want to be over-loaded with long-term loans, given potential liquidity problems that can be created in such a scenario. Therefore, as a general rule, they attempt to balance the concession periods of their loans. On this basis, every time a project is being analysed, it is also being analysed (or at least, should be) in conjunction with existing loans on the bank’s balance sheet.

Interest Rates as a Factor of Banks’ Willingness to Issue Debt for PPP
Interest Rates in the European Union have been set by the European Central Bank since the mid-1990s. As Figure 2 above illustrates, these have been at historically low levels for almost five years, meaning banks have had access to increased liquidity and perhaps some incentive to provide value-creating loans during the same period. In fact, when one considers how the Public Private Partnerships projects held up during the past number of years next to the economy, this would seem to hold true.

When banks are considering the interest rates as a factor to accept to fund a project or not, other projects’ interest rates are also a factor that should be considered. When two projects are deemed similar but one has a higher interest rate than the other, it doesn’t necessarily mean that the higher interest rate project will be funded over its competitor. The bank will also figure how likely the project is to maintain payments at higher interest rates over the concession period.

The interbank rate is a fundamental factor in how banks made lending decisions. As Figure 4 which follows illustrates, since the onset of Public-Private Partnerships in Italy, 3-month interbank exchange rates in Italy have been on a fairly consistent downward trajectory. This suggests several elements are at play but primarily that Italian banks have more access to liquidity than they did in the time before PPP (and thus can take on illiquid projects such as those of project finance).

Furthermore, should the interbank interest rate be relevant to the issuance of debt for project finance, one would expect the number of PPP deals to fall to some extent as the rate rises. That is to say, the two have a negative relationship: one tends to rise as the other falls and vice versa. This is broadly consistent with what seems to be happening when Figure 4 is compared with Figure 1 from previously. In particular, it is notable how PPP plateaus in 2009 as interbank rates rise.

Figure 4. Historical Italian 3-month Interbank RatesSource: Banco d’Italia

Inflation rates also play a factor. These are accounted for by the real interest rates in Figure 2, but nevertheless, a graph is indicative. Figure 5 below illustrates historical Italian inflation rates from 1995 to 2013. Most Central Banks target an inflation rate in the region of 2% annually and Italy has been very close to the target since PPP projects began in 1994. Given that Italy’s average inflation from 1958 to 2014 was 6.58%[2], it could well be that the low-inflation, low-interest environment has combined to make a set of circumstances which are amenable to project financing. This is what economic logic would lead us to believe.

Figure 5. Historical Italian Inflation Rates.

Source: Banco d’Italia

Solidity as a Factor in Banks’ Willingness to Issue Debt for PPP
The solidity of the main partner – which is the current equity position of the main partner – can be used as a proxy for the risk position of the firm. It follows that firms with more solidity should be willing to take on further debt. Or at least, they should be in a position to take on more debt if the occasion arises; whether or not management of the main partner are willing to take on the debt, is a matter of discretion.

Nowadays banks have proprietary risk-measurement tools (as permitted by the Basel III Accord), which means that each banks attributes different weights to different factors when measuring risk. Given that the weights behind these proprietary models are not disclosed, it is difficult to say too much about banks’ appetite for risk. It is suffice to say that they wish to minimize the risk. Maximizing their equity – four the purposes of this paper, the solidity – is one way of doing so.

Grimsey and Lewis (2002) note that PPP projects are characterized by all downside risks for banks, with very little to compensate on the upside: “the facilities often do not have a capital worth, in terms of a wide market, to which lenders would attribute value.” The authors seem to be suggesting that PPP is characterized by large liquidity risks, which would be another reason to opt for larger (more solid) SPVs. This view of risks taken by the banks is surely another reason for them to be reluctant to hold equity in the projects.

Akintoye et al (2001), note, “financial companies are involved in a rigorous process of project’s risks evaluation and subsequently they refine the terms and conditions  of their commitment…During this process, the finance companies utilize a range of tools to ensure effective fund provision, contract enforcement, sharing their market information and risk management skills.” In light of this, it would seem that banks are highly aware of the risks inherent in providing funding to PPP projects.

As the number of Public-Private Partnerships increases in Italy and as they become a mainstay on the Italian banking industry’s funding horizon, experience would suggest that banks will expose themselves to further risk with these projects. There is a marked tendency to take on more risk where one hasn’t been burned before.

Conclusions
As the recent global financial crisis illustrated in stark terms, banks are not immune to making irrational funding decisions. Given how low interest rates are currently set, many banks (although not all), for the moment at least, can make loans they wouldn’t otherwise make should interest rates be at traditional more higher levels. The potential for banks to make irrational funding decisions correspondingly becomes easier in such an environment where money is cheaper.

Italy didn’t escape the global financial crisis but did become one of the notorious PIGS[3] group, which were dogged by high public debts. These high public debts in Italy might also have contributed to a slow-down in projected infrastructure development by the government and on the private side, a reluctance to invest in projects where the partner was – by some predictions, at least – due to go bankrupt in the near future. In this environment, reading too much into Public-Private Partnerships in Italy can be unwise.

Nevertheless, the advent of Public-Private Partnerships in Italy in the 1990s offered a new avenue for Italian public projects on one side and an avenue to diversify funding opportunities for Italian financial institutions on the other. On the basis of financial theory, the initiative made the funding of Italian public projects more efficient. Likewise, judging by the growth in the industry in the intervening period, it is fair to say that the initiative has been well-received so far.

This study has put forward some theories about the decisions banks take while funding those same projects. Without data into the projects that don’t become funded and greater transparency in general on Italy’s Public-Private Partnerships, the research remains largely theoretical, rather than empirical. However, the small data sample did provide some insight into where funding decisions are being made by banks for Italian PPP. These data seem to suggest the following:

-          Italian firms are preferred as the main partner for funding.
-          Larger firms are preferred for funding.
-          There is no virtually no correlation at all between major partner size and project size.

Bibliography
Akintoye, A., Beck, M., Hardcastle, C., Chinyio, E., Asenova, D., (2001a). “The Financial Structure of Private Finance Initiatives.” 17th Annual ARCOM Conference, 5-7 September 2001, University of Salford. Association of Researchers in Construction Management, Vol. 1,
361-9.

Akintoye, A., Beck, M., Hardcastle, C., Chinyio, E., Asenova, D., (2001b). “Risk Identification Practises under PFI Envionment.” 17th Annual ARCOM Conference, 5-7 September 2001, University of Salford. Association of Researchers in Construction Management, Vol. 1, pp.875-883.

Akintoye, A., Beck, M., Hardcastle, C., Chinyio, E., Asenova, D., (2001c). “Management of Risks within the PFI environment.” 17th Annual ARCOM Conference, 5-7 September 2001, University of Salford. Association of Researchers in Construction Management, Vol. 1,
pp. 261-70.

Broadbent, J., Laughlin, R., (2003). “Evaluating the Private Finance Initiative in the National Health Service in the UK.” Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2003, pp. 422-445.

Esty, B. C.(2003) "The economic motivations for using project finance."Harvard Business School 28.

Grimsey, D., Lewis, M., (2002). “Evaluating the risks of public private partnerships for infrastructure projects.”  International Journal of Project Management 20, pp107-118.


[1] http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2011/07/italys-finances-0?fsrc=scn/fb/wl/bl/pubskittlestheitalianversion
[2] http://www.tradingeconomics.com/italy/inflation-cpi
[3] Denominating Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain.

Sunday, June 1, 2014

The Australian Banking System is an Oligopoly



Oligopoly is a well-defined theory of economics that needs little introduction. All economists from Keynesians to Classicists agree on its parameters. Put simply, it is “a situation in which a particular market is controlled by a small number of firms. An oligopoly is much like a monopoly, in which one company exerts control over most of a market. In an oligopoly, there are at least 2 firms controlling the market.”[1] Even to an outsider of economics, this appears to describe well what has happened inside the Australian banking system with the “four pillars.”
The Four Pillars

The “four pillars” is a name given to the four banks that dominate the Australian Banking sector. These are, in descending order of size, the Commonwealth Bank, Westpac Banking Corporation, the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group and the National Australia Bank. The “four pillars” name conveys importance – and indeed, the banks are of significant importance to the stability of the Australian economy at large – but given their similarity to each other, the banks might well be known as the “four sisters.”

By any stretch of the term, the “four pillars” operate in a virtually unchallenged oligopoly, controlling between them around 80% of the Australian banking sector at any one time. The issue is a constant topic of discussion (and grievance) in the Australian media (one article referred to them as the “four pillows”), who note that the banks have become omnipotent since deregulation of the finance industry occurred at the beginning of the 1980s, after the by-now infamous Campbell Report (1981).

How the Oligopoly was Created

Deregulation of the Australian financial system began in the early 1980s. Its primary goal was to stabilize the Australian economy (which was doing badly at the time) and put Australian banks on a more even footing with their international peers. The steps taken to achieve this in the initial phase of deregulation were the free-float of the Australian dollar and the abolition of direct interest rates and portfolio controls for banks and other financial institutions at the end of 1983, issuing new foreign exchange licenses in 1984 and granting foreign bank licenses in 1985.

Assessing these reforms is difficult. Likewise, try to establish if deregulation was in fact responsible for the breakaway group of four large banks in Australia is almost impossible to tell. Giving banks the ability to compete on a level playing field with international competitors is no bad thing in itself, of course. And allowing the Australian dollar to free-float is in line with most economies around the world. That is not to say that the process happened without anyone observing.

A series of mergers (mergers are almost always acquisitions) occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, which, at least in part led to the oligopoly that the Australian banking system now plays host to.  National and regional governments allowed their own savings banks (such as the NSW bank or the State Bank of South Australia, for example) to be purchased by larger commercial banks, in a series of bolt-on acquisitions. I believe now – although it is easy to be wise after the fact – that these acquisitions should not have been given the go-ahead by the competition authority, as they were sowing the seeds for the oligopoly now evident in the sector.

Assessing Oligopolies
That banking in Australia is an oligopoly is hardly surprising. In his book, Principles of Economics (2008), Gregory Mankiw gives examples of oligopolies that exist in various industries in the United States based on figures provided by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Federal Trade Commission. The list is extensive. It includes breakfast cereal with a concentration of 92%[2], soft drinks with a concentration of 93%, and beer, with a concentration of 85%. These figures at least show that banking is not alone as an oligopoly.

Given that so many industries take the structure of oligopolies, why is there such an issue when banking takes a similar market structure? In short, the answer is that banks most likely play the role of scapegoats. They become an easy target for everything that is ill with the economy. 

The Herald Sun neatly captures this in one of its opinion pieces from August 2008:[3]
“Kevin Rudd[4]  goes for a crowd favourite – greedy bankers:
Kevin Rudd stands accused of bank-bashing after vowing to penalise financial institutions that lavish executives with multi-million-dollar pay packages without requiring them to follow responsible investment practises.
Mr. Rudd has asked the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority to prepare rules penalising banks that reward risky behaviour by requiring them to have greater capital reserves than those with more responsible investment practises.
…How the crowd hoots!”

The reality is that oligopolies – in the banking industry or otherwise - aren’t as bad as the media and others would like to portray. A cursory glance at interest rates offered by the “four pillars” shows that they offer consumers a reasonably good spread of interest rates on loans over the same period[5]. By the principles of an oligopoly, all would be striving to offer as small a spread as possible. I still contend that the Australian banking system is an oligopoly but that it is in fact quickly heading towards a monopoly.

In 2012, the range between the market capitalizations of each of the four pillars varied between $30bn and $35bn. As of May 2014, the range is over $51bn, with the Commonweath Bank opening up a considerable distance between its valuation and that of the National Australia Bank (see chart on next page) Likewise, in 2012, the range between the leading two banks, Commonwealth Bank and Westpac Banking Corporation was approximately $20bn. It is now $25bn.

Bank
Market Cap (May 2014)
Commonwealth Bank
$130bn
Westpac Banking Corporation
$105bn
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group
$91bn
National Australia Bank
$79bn
Source: Bloomberg
An Increasing Need for Regulation
The “four pillars” which began as “the six pillars” (when it included Australia’s two large insurance firms), seem sacred to successive governments in Australia. Various excuses are given for the sanctity of the four. The latest on record was given by the head of the current government’s financial system inquiry, David Murray, whose reasoning goes: “if you relax the four pillars policy and went to three, inevitably in some unforeseen circumstance you would finish up having to go to two. And at two, there is definitely a too big to fail question.” So much for sound economic analysis.

What Murray and others in government consistently fail to recognize is that countries which suffered massive banking crises in the not-too-distant past all had banking oligopolies which, in fact, were less concentrated than Australia’s (Australia’s being the most concentrated banking sector in the world)[6]. Given this is the case, it would seem like negligence to ignore the fact that Australia’s banking industry is need of a regulatory shake-up. However, despite the glaring need, there is still opposition from the big four and even the financial regulator in Australia.

When the IMF provided an assessment of Australia’s big 4 in November 2012, the response from those in Australia was predictably hostile. After suggesting in the report that the big 4 should possibly hold more capital to further bolster financial system stability, “Australian Prudential Regulation Authority chairman John Laker and ANZ’s John Morschel rejected the finding, and Westpac’s Lindsay Maxsted warned the banking industry risked becoming globally uncompetitive if there was a further increase in capital requirements.”[7] Anyone who has taken a look at the Australian banking sector would know that these individuals aren’t overly concerned with competition. Capital requirements often have leaders of the banking industry come over in a fit of competitive spirit, however. The IMF’s report was also met with the common lambast that Australian banks are “amongst the most highly capitalized in the world.”

Further Down the Road
As I have pointed out elsewhere in this paper, Australia’s banking industry is not only an oligopoly but it appears to be heading towards a monopoly (or at least a duopoly). The financial industry, which is now a few times the size of Australian GDP (admittedly not unusual for most countries´ financial sector) is in desperate need of regulation. There exists a good chance that the gulf between the largest bank in the “four pillars” will open up a bigger and bigger gap between itself and the fourth biggest of the group.

The popular media in Australia often mentions politicians and financial leaders talking about the need to be competitive internationally (as Australia’s banks seek to tie up business abroad), but this ignores the fact that Australia avoids many banking crises by the very fact that it hasn’t been closely linked to the global financial system until now. By becoming more intertwined with outside banking systems, its risks become more systemic.

Australia’s authorities have failed to see that these banks are already “too big to fail.” By allowing them to grow in the same manner in which they have been until now is negligent on their part. The fifth biggest bank by assets is only around a quarter of the size of the fourth[8], meaning the hegemony is unlikely to be broken anytime soon. The Australian government needs to take action in one of any number of ways. Among potential measures which they could take are:

i)             Higher capital controls for the four pillars than other banks. In this manner, at least other banks are given an incentive to play “catch up.”
ii)            Higher capital controls for all banks, thereby making the system safer, although possibly doing little to break up the existing oligopoly.
iii)           Allow a foreign bank to take over one of the four pillars. This is probably too politically unpopular to ever happen now.
iv)           Nationalize and merge some smaller banks to create a fifth pillar.
v)            Re-regulate some sections of the financial system, such as funds, to encourage new business startup and banks to break off sections of their businesses.

Conclusion
I believe that the seeds for Australia’s banking system oligopoly were sown in the 1980s by a series of government bank sell-offs. From my reading of the literature, there was little strategy behind these sell-offs with no thought given to the consequences of what the purchase of these assets by larger commercial banks would mean for the banking system. Those changes occurred and are now impossible to undo. Given this, regulators need to look at some changes to implement before the banks’ oligopoly becomes any more dangerous to the economy at large.

The reality is that none of the measures I have suggested here are likely to be given the go ahead (with the exception of higher capital controls and probably only after it is too late). Australia’s banking system is clearly an oligopoly and becoming more entrenched in that position as time goes on. Its regulators and politicians need to force through some changes in the financial industry before it becomes the latest textbook example of how a country whose regulators failed to react to the signs before it was too late.








[1] Taken from: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/oligopoly.asp
[2] Meaning that the top 4 producers have a concentration of this amount.
[3] http://blogs.news.com.au/heraldsun/andrewbolt/index.php/heraldsun/comments/bash_the_greedy_scapegoat/P80/
[4] Then Prime Minister of Australia
[5] http://australia.deposits.org/
[6] http://www.tai.org.au/node/1926
[7] http://www.clmr.unsw.edu.au/article/risk/imf-reports-australias-high-compliance-international-standards-raises-concerns-over-market
[8]